Essays on Residential Segregation, the Economics of Prestige at the Elite Colleges, and Property Rights by Blair, Peter
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
1-1-2015
Essays on Residential Segregation, the Economics
of Prestige at the Elite Colleges, and Property
Rights
Peter Blair
University of Pennsylvania, pqblair@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons, Economics Commons, Higher
Education Administration Commons, and the Higher Education and Teaching Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1015
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blair, Peter, "Essays on Residential Segregation, the Economics of Prestige at the Elite Colleges, and Property Rights" (2015). Publicly
Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1015.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1015
Essays on Residential Segregation, the Economics of Prestige at the Elite
Colleges, and Property Rights
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I propose a new method for
estimating the racial tipping points of US neighborhoods. Applying this method to US census data, I find that
the average neighborhood tipping point has increased from 15% in 1970 to 42% in 2010. Moreover, I find that
from 1970-2010 that differences in racial preferences play a diminishing role in explaining cross city
differences in tipping points. Differences in the outside options of white householdâ??s, on the other hand,
play an increasingly important role in explaining cross city differences in tipping points from 1970-2010.
In the second chapter of the dissertation, which is joint work with Kent Smetters, we document an important
fact about Ivy League Schools. In the past 13 years the demand for undergraduate admission to Ivy League
schools has doubled while the number of available spaces has increased by less than 3%. We show that this
pattern can be explained by a model in which elite schools restrict supply in order to maintain their relative
selectivity. Focusing on Harvard, Yale and Princeton, we find that the resulting loss in social surplus is an
average of $73M for each school (annually), with producers (schools) bearing the larger absolute loss in social
surplus and consumers (students) bearing the larger relative loss in social surplus.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I use a two country treatment-control design to study an economic
policy in the Bahamas that restricted the property rights of non-natives. Contrary to the prevailing view in the
development literature that restricted property rights reduces GDP growth; I find that GDP growth in the
Bahamas increased while this policy was in place (relative to a peer country Barbados, which did not have a
similar policy). When the policy is repealed, I find that there are large inflows of foreign capital to the
Bahamas with no corresponding increase in GDP growth. This study highlights the importance of
differentiating between the property rights of natives and non-natives as separate channels for promoting
economic growth in small developing countries.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Applied Economics
First Advisor
Todd Sinai
Keywords
Bahamas, Economic Development, Economics Thesis, Elite Universities, Property Rights, Tipping Points
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1015
Subject Categories
Demography, Population, and Ecology | Economics | Higher Education Administration | Higher Education
and Teaching
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1015
ESSAYS ON RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION, THE ECONOMICS OF PRESTIGE AT
THE ELITE COLLEGES, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Peter Q. Blair
A DISSERTATION
in
Applied Economics
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2015
Supervisor of Dissertation
Todd Sinai, Professor, Real Estate and Business Economics and Public Policy
Graduate Group Chairperson
Eric Bradlow, Professor of Marketing, Statistics, and Education
Dissertation Committee
Fernando Ferreira, Associate Professor of Real Estate and Business Economics and Public
Policy; Gilles Duranton, Dean’s Chair in Real Estate Professor; Kent Smetters, Boettner
Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy
ESSAYS ON RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION, THE ECONOMICS OF PRESTIGE AT
THE ELITE COLLEGES, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
c© COPYRIGHT
2015
Peter Q. Blair
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
Dedicated to
I dedicate this thesis to my mom Judith Carol Blair, who sacrificed finishing her PhD in
order to raise my six brothers and me. Mom your love for us and your dedication to seeing us
be all that we can be inspires me. Many times when I was feeling uncertain or discouraged
along this process you were always there to pray with me, encourage me and challenge me
to do something that took me out of my comfort zone. I love you more than the words and
equations in this thesis can express – they are all for you and because of you Mom.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
So many people have journeyed with me over the past 14 years that I have been in school
– nine of them in graduate school. As I turn to thank these journey mates, I am reminded
of the words of the Jewish King Solomon, who said “Except the Lord build the house, they
labor in vain that built it.” I thank the Lord for being with me through the highs and lows
of graduate school and for gifting me with incredible advisers and dedicated friends.
To my committee, Todd, Fernando, Kent and Gilles – thank-you for sharpening me through
this process. Todd, I value your deep economic intuition and the way that you understand
my strengths and weaknesses. Fernando, thank-you for always making the time to talk with
me about research and for pushing me to cultivate my empirical skills. Kent, thank-you for
being open-minded, admitting this particle physicist-turned economist to this program. I
have enjoyed working with you on our paper, and learning from you how to build simple,
yet powerful models! Gilles, in addition to being awesome (just by virtue of being French),
I value the way that you challenged me to think and figure out what was deeply wrong, and
in some cases, correct, about the work that I did :). I also owe a special debt of gratitude
to Maisy Wong, who met with me consistently during my first few years of graduate school
and encouraged me to begin writing the first chapter of this thesis during my first year at
Wharton. Thank-you, Maisy. I also thank Prof. Susan Wachter, Stuart Hean, Lynn Selhat
as well as my fellow graduate students at Wharton for generously giving their time to help
me develop as a scholar.
To my friends Daniel DeVougas, Mickey Whitzer, Dion Cunningham, Kinde Wubneh, Tout
Wang, Sorell Massenberg, Stephen Lafata, Mike and Hannah Rizk, Eliud Ramocan, Luke
Stewart, Thummim Cho, Stephen Odaibo, Deriba Olana, Konrad Osa, Chris Trimble, Philip
Winter, Franco Nilo, Joseph Bataille, Daniel Summerhayes, Neil Abraham, Charles Robin-
son, Nicholas Litombe, Greg Akingbiyi, Fred Roland, Reggie Roberson, Marthony Robins,
Kory Efunnuga, David Stremic, Gabe Bouch, Nadia Souri, Nico Cernek, Onoso Imoagene
iv
the ManS1on and Antioch Calvary Chapel Communities and Rafael Luna – thank you for
being such an integral part of this journey. Your prayers and encouragements have sustained
me.
To my family members, my dad Leslie Blair, brothers Steve, Julian, Marvin, Andrew (de-
ceased), Tim, and Paul; and my second mom Janet Jibberson and my nephew Moses and
my nieces Chassity-Twyla and Sierra-Kennedy, thank you for always challenging me to be
my best.
I also could not have done this PhD without the financial support of the Wharton School, the
Mustard Seed Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Amy Morse Foundation,
the Government and people of the Bahamas, the Lyford Cay Foundation, the Mellon Mays
Foundation, and the Bell Labs Foundation. Importantly, I owe deep debt of gratitude
to Mrs. Sheila Ferguson, Prof. Melissa Franklin and Prof. Chris Stubbs of the Harvard
Physics Department, who encouraged me to cultivate my interest in economics during my
time at Harvard, even as I pursed a PhD in Physics. I am also grateful to the following
economics professors, who supported me during my first forays into economics, while I was
contemplating the transition from physics to economics: Edward Glaeser, David Laibson,
Devin Pope, Ernst Fehr, Chris Avery and Roland Fryer.
As an undergraduate student, my initial passion for research was sparked by Duke Professor
Arlie Petters, who is a deeply influential and inspirational mentor. Arlie, thank you believing
in me, expecting nothing but the highest level of excellence from me and for being an
example to me of how to do it and succeed despite the odds. Lastly, I wish to express
my gratitude to some of my earliest teachers – Julie Arthur, Sheri Anderson and Janet
Jibberson who are responsible for seeing talent in me and cultivating it. I hope to pay it
forward by mentoring others as you have mentored me. There are innumerable others that
are not mentioned here but who have helped me throughout the process. Thank-you all!
v
ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION, THE ECONOMICS OF PRESTIGE AT
THE ELITE COLLEGES, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Peter Q. Blair
Todd Sinai
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I propose
a new method for estimating the racial tipping points of US neighborhoods. Applying this
method to US census data, I find that the average neighborhood tipping point has increased
from 15% in 1970 to 42% in 2010. Moreover, I find that from 1970-2010 that differences
in racial preferences play a diminishing role in explaining cross city differences in tipping
points. Differences in the outside options of white household’s, on the other hand, play
an increasingly important role in explaining cross city differences in tipping points from
1970-2010.
In the second chapter of the dissertation, which is joint work with Kent Smetters, we
document an important fact about Ivy League Schools. In the past 13 years the demand for
undergraduate admission to Ivy League schools has doubled while the number of available
spaces has increased by less than 3%. We show that this pattern can be explained by a
model in which elite schools restrict supply in order to maintain their relative selectivity.
Focusing on Harvard, Yale and Princeton, we find that the resulting loss in social surplus is
an average of $73M for each school (annually), with producers (schools) bearing the larger
absolute loss in social surplus and consumers (students) bearing the larger relative loss in
social surplus.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I use a two country treatment-control design to
study an economic policy in the Bahamas that restricted the property rights of non-natives.
Contrary to the prevailing view in the development literature that restricted property rights
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reduces GDP growth, I find that GDP growth in the Bahamas increased while this policy was
in place (relative to a peer country Barbados, which did not have a similar policy). When
the policy is repealed, I find that there are large inflows of foreign capital to the Bahamas
with no corresponding increase in GDP growth. This study highlights the importance of
differentiating between the property rights of natives and non-natives as separate channels
for promoting economic growth in small developing countries.
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PREFACE
“There are those who seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge; that is Curiosity.
There are those who seek knowledge to be known by others; that is Vanity.
There are those who seek knowledge in order to serve; that is Love.” (Bernard
of Clairvaux)
These essays highlight my deep interest as an economist into researching issues of access
and equity in the domains of housing, education and economic development in the Third
World.
xiii
CHAPTER 1 : The Effect of Outside Options on Neighborhood Tipping Points
Abstract: Recent estimates of tipping points in the literature suggest that racial progress
in the United States has been slow. According to these estimates, the mean tipping point
of US cities increased by 1 percentage point per decade – from 12% in 1970 to 14% in 1990
(Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008). I develop a new method for estimating the tipping points
of census tracts within cities. These new estimates paint a more optimistic picture of racial
progress in the United States: the mean tract-level tipping point has increased from 15%
in 1970 to 42% in 2010; and the mean city tipping point has increased from 13% in 1970
to 35% in 2010. I show that the previous estimates of city or metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), tipping points are smaller than my estimates because they are local averages of the
tipping point of the marginal census tracts – the tracts that are close to tipping. Because I
estimate tipping points at the census tract level, my city tipping points are averages of the
tipping points of both marginal and infra-marginal census tracts.
1
1.1. Introduction
A neighborhood tips when a marginal increase in its minority population leads to white flight
from the neighborhood. Given the link between racial segregation and adverse outcomes for
minorities, it is important to understand the mechanisms that drive neighborhood tipping.1
Furthermore, neighborhood tipping points can be important parameters for place-based
policies like the Moving to Opportunity Experiment (MTO). In place-based programs where
the treatment is the destination neighborhood, it may be important to discern whether the
act of assigning minority households to a destination might itself result in the neighborhood
tipping, thereby undermining the intended treatment (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007).
I define a household’s neighborhood as the census tract where it resides, and its outside
options as the set of all of the other census tracts in its MSA of residence. I impose an
incentive compatibility constraint on the exit decision of non-minority households. Non-
minority households exit their current neighborhood only in the face of racial integration if
exercising their outside option delivers more utility than remaining in their current neigh-
borhood. By imposing this constraint, I am able to exploit sorting patterns in the data to
estimate static tipping points at the census tract level which are defined within the context
of a discrete choice model of housing (McFadden 1978; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995;
Bayer et al. 2007). The two main contributions of this papers are: (i) I provide a method for
computing census tract tipping points (ii) I produce estimates of census tract tipping points
for the census tracts of 123 US cities that cover the five most recent censuses (1970-2010).
Computing tipping points for individual census tracts is a methodological contribution to
the empirical literature on tipping, which has progressed from the national level (Easterly
2009) to estimating tipping points at the MSA level (Card et. al. 2008). In some cases, the
distribution of census tract tipping points is disperse and an MSA average may mask this
1Segregation impacts the provision of public goods to minorities, particularly if preferences for redistribu-
tion are local (Zeckhauser 1993; Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben 2005). Additionally, residential segregation
creates spatial mismatches: minorities are disconnected from jobs, role models, and opportunities to interact
with non-minorities, which may result in the persistence of racial stereotypes (Kain 1968).
2
heterogeneity. Mobile, AL and New Jersey provide an illustrative case (Figure 1). In 1970,
both cities have a mean MSA tipping point of 22%. In Mobile, the dispersion about this
mean is large, whereas for New Jersey there is relatively less dispersion about this mean.
As such, an MSA-wide place-based policy is more likely to work consistently in New Jersey,
whereas Mobile would require more locally targeted policy to account for the heterogeneity
in tipping points by census tract.
In computing the tipping points for the 38,466 tracts in my data, I find that the mean
neighborhood (tract) tipping point in the United States has increased at a rate of 6 per-
centage points per decade – from 15% in 1970 to 42% in 2010. To compare these results
with the literature, I aggregate my tract tipping points to the city level and find that the
mean metropolitan statistical area (MSA) tipping points also increased at an average rate
of 5 percentage points per decade from 13% (1970) to 35% (2010). According to other
estimates in the literature, the mean tipping point of US cities increased from 12% in 1970
to 14% in 1990 – an average of 1 percentage point per decade (Card, Mas, and Rothstein
2008). I show that prior estimates understated city tipping points because they reflected
the average tipping points of only marginal census tracts in the city (i.e., those that were
close to tipping), whereas my estimates are an average of the tipping points of both the
marginal and infra-marginal census tracts in a city.
In the data, I also find evidence that cross-sectional differences in city tipping points de-
pend crucially on the outside options of non-minority households. Moreover, the relative
importance of outside options in explaining cross-sectional differences in city tipping points
vis-a`-vis racial preferences is increasing over time. In 1970, a decrease of one standard
deviation in the clustering of minorities was correlated with a 1.1 percentage point increase
in the city tipping point.2 In 2010, a similar decrease in the clustering of minorities was
correlated with an increase of 14 percentage points in the tipping point. By contrast, in
1970, a one-standard-deviation increase in the relative preference of non-minorities for mi-
2A reduced level of minority clustering means that the outside option consists of fewer tracts with only
non-minority households.
3
nority neighbors was correlated with a 6.6 percentage point increase in the mean MSA
tipping point; in 2010, however, the effect was statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Since outside options become increasingly relevant over time, and racial preferences become
less predictive of cross-sectional differences in tipping points, it is important to model tip-
ping phenomena with outside options playing a key role. Moreover, in many branches of
economics, outside options matter for modeling the decision of agents.3
Historically, the debate between sociologists and economists on tipping centered on whether
neighborhood tipping reflects racial animus of non-minorities (whites) toward minorities.
In an early essay, “The Metropolitan Areas as Racial Problem,” University of Chicago po-
litical scientist Morton Grodzins (1958) asserted that neighborhood tipping reflects “the
unwillingness of white groups to live in proximity to large numbers of [African Americans].”
Later work by economists, notably Thomas Schelling (1969, 1971), challenged this view,
demonstrating with a set of intuitive and simple models that segregation, at the neighbor-
hood and city levels, could occur even if white households, at the individual level, did not
possess a strong aversion to living in communities with minorities. One of the limitations of
this model, as Schelling himself noted, was that it did not include a role for outside options:
“This is but a small sample of possible results, using straight-line schedules and simple
dynamics. There are no expectations in the model, no speculation, no concerted action, no
restriction on the alternative localities available” (Schelling 1969).
The key insight of this paper is that the tipping threshold for a non-minority household
depends on its preferences for minority neighbors and on the household’s outside options.
In some cases, the dearth of preferable outside options will result in a tipping threshold that
is high (more racial integration is tolerated) even though non-minority households have a
strong relative preference for living with other non-minorities. As an example, consider
3The canonical principal agent model of contract theory (Jullien 2000) is one example in economics
where outside options matter for decision making by individual agents and the firm. In job search models
in macroeconomics (McCall 1970; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994), outside options matter for aggregate
market outcomes such as mean unemployment duration. Outside options have also been used to illustrate
scenarios in which the Coase Conjecture fails (Board and Pycia 2014).
4
a city with a choice-set of two census tracts: tract W, which is 100% non-minority, and
tract M, which is 100% minority. Suppose further that non-minority households in the city
have a relative preference for non-minority neighbors. What happens if minorities integrate
tract W? Would non-minority households exit tract W in preference for tract M? No. Non-
minority households are better off if they remain in tract W, which has marginally fewer non-
minorities (even after integration) than if they exit to tract M, which is maximally minority
occupied. In fact, contrary to the intuition that a stronger relative preference for same-race
neighbors leads to more white flight, the stronger the white household’s preferences for
white neighbors, the more likely it will be to remain in tract W even as the neighborhood
integrates. In the same way that competition for employees among firms sets the cost
of discriminating against minority employees (Becker 1993), the availability of preferable
outside options sets the cost of acting on racial preferences in the housing market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I model the neighborhood choice
of households. In section 3, I define the tipping point. I discuss the data in section 4,
followed by a description of the empirical strategy in section 5 and a discussion of the
results in section 6. I end with a summary of the key findings.
1.2. Model
The key goal of my model is to generate a relationship between the neighborhood tipping
point and two quantities: (a) the utility wedge between an agent’s current neighborhood
and his/her outside options; and (b) the marginal utility for minority neighbors. The model
consists of a demand side, in which households have neighborhood preferences that depend
on the endogenous racial mix of the neighborhood and the price of housing services in the
neighborhood, as well as other amenities therein. I follow the literature in focusing on the
demand side and abstracting from the influence of changes in housing supply on tipping
points (Card et. al. 2008, Caetano and Maheshri 2013).
A household’s choice-set consists of all of the census tracts in its MSA. Accordingly, its
5
outside option consists of all of the tracts in its MSA excluding its current tract of residence.
In cities where there are many minority tracts, the outside option will impact the ability of
non-minorities to exit their neighborhoods of residence. With this definition of households’
choice-set, I use a discrete choice model to exploit within-MSA sorting patterns in the data
to obtain tipping points for each census tract-year observation (McFadden 1978; Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Bayer et al. 2007). I use data from N census tracts in an
MSA from two consecutive census periods to estimate 2N tipping points – one for each
census-tract-year observation. Using the approach in Card et. al. (2008) and similar data
generates a single tipping point – the MSA tipping point.
In the model, I construct the tipping point in two steps. First, I use the estimates of the
sorting model to compute an exit function of white households from the neighborhood. For
a given exogenous change in the mean utility of whites in neighborhood, τ , the exit function
measures the probability that a white household exits its current neighborhood for its best
alternative in its choice-set. I refer to τ as the utility tolerance of white households since
it parametrizes the exit probability as a function of changes in the mean utility of whites.
At the tipping point, the first derivative of the exit function, the exit rate, equals zero, and
the tolerance equals τ∗. This definition of tipping is similar to the approach in Card et al.
(2008), which associates the tipping point with the share of minorities for which the rate
of decline in white population is maximal. I get the tipping point by converting the utility
tolerance into a percent minority by using an empirical relationship between the percent
minority and the mean utility.
1.2.1. Demand Side
In the model, there are C cities indexed c ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}, and two types of households
that are differentiated by a type index, r ∈ {w,m}. The type index r = w references
white households, while the type index r = m references minority households. Each city is
exogenously assigned a total of Qwtot white households and total of Q
m
tot minority households.
Each household, in turn, endogenously sorts into one of the N neighborhoods in that city,
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indexed by n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. The sorting of households to neighborhoods depends on the
household income, the price of housing in equilibrium, and the equilibrium level of amenities
in each of the N neighborhoods.
A household’s problem is to choose the neighborhood that delivers the maximum utility.
Solving the household’s problem requires first solving for the indirect utility for each of
the N possible neighborhoods, and then choosing the neighborhood that delivers the max-
imum indirect utility. Households h of type r have utility over neighborhood amenities,
consumption, and housing services in each neighborhood n. The utility function takes the
form:
Uhnr = log(Ahnr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amenities
+αlog(Chnr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption
+βlog(Hhnr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Housing
, for r ∈ {w,m}. (1.1)
The parameters α and β are the consumption and housing shares. The neighborhood
amenity, Ahnr, consists of an endogenous component and an exogenous component in ad-
dition to an idiosyncratic taste shock:
log(Ahnr) = γrfn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endog. Amenity
+ θX︸︷︷︸
Exog. Amenities
+ ξn︸︷︷︸
Unobs. Quality
+ hnr︸︷︷︸
Taste Shocks
. (1.2)
The endogenous amenity is the racial composition of neighborhood, fmn =
Qmn
Qmn +Q
w
n
, which is
the percent minority in the neighborhood. The value of the endogenous amenity varies by
agent type, with whites valuing a 1% increase in the minority share by an amount γw, and
minorities valuing a 1% increase in the minority share by an amount γm. The X’s represent
observable characteristics of the neighborhood, which also capture the overall quality of
the neighborhood and the ξnr unobservable measures of neighborhood quality, which may
vary by race. I assume that the taste shocks are i.i.d. and follow a type 1 extreme value
distribution. This assumption makes it convenient to obtain closed-form solutions without
compromising the key insight of the model – which is that the choice-set of white agents
impacts the neighborhood tipping points – and allows for the estimation of sub-MSA tipping
points.
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Solving for the Indirect Utility of a Neighborhood
For each neighborhood n households choose a bundle of consumption Chnr and housing
Hhnr to maximize utility, subject to the household’s budget constraint:
Chnr + pnHhnr ≤ Ih. (1.3)
Consumption is the numeraire good, and housing price pn is in terms of units of consump-
tion. The household’s income Ih is exogenously determined and independent of the house-
hold’s choice of a neighborhood n. For neighborhood n, the optimal bundle (C∗hnr, H
∗
hnr)
is:
C∗hnr =
Å
αr
αr + βr
ã
Ih (1.4)
H∗hnr =
Å
βr
αr + βr
ãÅ
Ih
pn
ã
, (1.5)
and the associated indirect utility is:
V˜hnr = γr
Ç
Qmn
Qmn +Q
w
n
å
+ (αr + βr)log(Ih)− βrlog(pn) +Xθ + ξn + hnr. (1.6)
To simplify notation, I define Vhnr, the deterministic part of the indirect utility, using the
following relation:
V˜hnr = Vhnr + hnr. (1.7)
Solving for Neighborhood Demand
After having solved for the indirect utility for each neighborhood, each household of income
Ih and type r chooses the neighborhood, n
∗
hr, that delivers the highest indirect utility:
n∗hr = arg max{Vhnr} (1.8)
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The household’s utility-maximizing behavior across the N neighborhoods in the city gener-
ates a conditional demand function, Qrn (~p| Ih), for each neighborhood by both household
type and household income category Ih. The conditional demand functions take the form:
Qrn (~p|Ih) = Qrtot
á
exp(Vhnr)
N∑
n′=1
exp(Vhn′r)
ë
, for r ∈ {w,m}, (1.9)
where ~pn = {p1, p2, ..., pN} is the vector of house prices for all neighborhoods in the city.
The unconditional demand for neighborhood n by households of type r equals the sum of
the conditional demand functions over the income categories:
Qrn ( ~pn) =
∑
h
Qrn (~p|Ih), for r ∈ {w,m} (1.10)
1.3. Tipping Point
In the empirical literature on tipping, the tipping point of a neighborhood n is defined by
a threshold minority fraction, f∗n. When the minority fraction of the neighborhood exceeds
this threshold, whites exit the neighborhood at a rapid rate. Below this threshold, changes
in the white population of the neighborhood are less stark. In the context of this model,
I define the tipping point of a neighborhood as corresponding to the minority fraction for
which the exit rate of whites from the neighborhood is maximal.
In order to compute the tipping point, I first construct the exit function for each neighbor-
hood. This exit function traces out the probability of white flight from the neighborhood n
as a function of the decrease in utility experienced by whites in the neighborhood due to the
arrival of minorities. I adopt a similar approach to Caetano and Maheshri (2013) by using
counter-factual decreases in the utility of whites to construct the exit function. The exit
function also depends on the utility wedge between the household’s inside option, Vhnw, and
the household’s next best alternative, Vha(n)w, where the notation a(n) is the neighborhood
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that is the household’s best alternative should it choose to relocate to another census tract
in the same MSA.
After constructing the exit probability as a function of the counter-factual decrease in utility,
I will solve for the utility of whites in the neighborhood at the tipping point by solving for
the inflection point of the exit function: the level of utility for which the second derivative
of the exit function is zero. The first derivative of the exit function is the exit rate. The
second derivative, which is required to solve for the inflection point, captures the marginal
exit rate. When the marginal exit rate equals zero, the exit rate is maximal.
1.3.1. Conditional Exit Functions
Following the arrival of new minority households to a neighborhood n, some white house-
holds may find it preferable to exit the neighborhood and relocate to the best alternative
among the other N-1 neighborhoods in its city, neighborhood a(n), instead of remaining in
neighborhood n. I use τnw to represent the loss in indirect utility that white households
of income category h experience due to the arrival of new minority households to their
host neighborhood n. The conditional exit function of whites, which represents the exit
probability of whites of a given income category, is given by:
E(τnw; ~V |Ih) =
∑
a(n)
Prob(Vhnw − τnw + nhnw < Vha(n)w + ha(n)w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. exit n for a(n)
× ωa(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. a(n) is best opt.

(1.11)
=
∑
a(n)
Ñ ∞∫
−∞
F (Vha(n)w − Vhnw + τnw + ha(n)w)f(ha(n)w)dha(n)w
ωha(n)w
é
,
(1.12)
where ωha(n)w is the probability that neighborhood a(n) ∈ {1, 2, ..n−1, n+1, ...N} is the best
alternative among the N-1 options in the household’s choice-set, and F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function for the taste shocks, which I assume follow a type 1 extreme value
10
distribution. The probability weight ωha(n)w is assumed to be the share of whites in the
alternative neighborhood a(n) relative to the total number of whites in the MSA excluding
the current tract n:
ωha(n)w =
exp(Vha(n)w)∑
a∈{a(n)}
exp(Vhaw)
. (1.13)
Each non-minority household living in a given tract will have a single best alternative.
However, since I do not observe all of the covariates of an individual non-minority household,
I average over all the non-minority households in a neighborhood to obtain a probability
than a given tract in the MSA is best alternative for non-minority households in this tract.
The probability weights in equation (1.13) are type of counter-factual market shares for
utility maximizing non-minority households who face a choice-set of the N-1 census tracts
in the MSA, where census tract n has been excluded from consideration. As such these
weights present the probability that a tract a(n) is the best option of the N-1 tracts for
non-minority households. Since I have assumed that preferences are homogeneous with-in
racial group but heterogeneous across racial group, these probability weights are natural
measures of the probability that tract a(n) is the best alternative for a moving agent.4
1.3.2. Unconditional Exit Function
The unconditional exit probability of whites from neighborhood n is the sum of the con-
ditional exit functions weighted by the number of households in the income category that
corresponds to the individual conditional demand functions, Qwhn, as a fraction of the total
number of whites in neighborhood n, Qwn :
E(τnw; ~V ) =
15∑
h=1
Ç
E(τnw; ~V |Ih) · Q
w
hn
Qwn
å
(1.14)
The unconditional exit function will be dominated by the behavior of whites in the most
highly represented income categories in the neighborhood. This is captured in the weight-
4This assumption is particularly reliable for cases where there are a large number of census tracts in the
MSA. In these cases, the removal a single census tract has a diminishing effect on the overall sorting in the
MSA as the number of tracts in the MSA increases. In the paper, we follow the literature and restrict our
analysis to MSAs with at least 100 census tracts (Card et. al. 2008).
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ing. As the utility drop becomes large and positive, due to the arrival of minorities, the
exit probability goes to one, and all whites exit the neighborhood. In the opposite limit, as
τnw gets arbitrarily large and negative, which corresponds to whites moving into the neigh-
borhood, the probability of white residents exiting the neighborhood converges to zero. In
general, the exit function will resemble an S-curve with τnw on the horizontal axis and the
associated conditional exit probability on the vertical axis.
1.3.3. Tipping Point
The tipping point of the neighborhood is the percent minority at the inflection point of the
exit function. This is the point at which the exit function changes concavity and the exit
rate (the derivative of the exit function with respect to τnw) is maximal:
d2E(τ∗nw; ~V )
dτnw2
= 0. (1.15)
At the tipping point, the mean utility of white households in neighborhood n has decreased
by an amount −τ∗n. I use the the relative marginal utility for minority neighbors to convert
this decrement in mean utility into a change in the percent minority. Accordingly, the
percent minority at the tipping point is given by:
f∗n = fn −
τ∗n
γw − γm (1.16)
The first piece of the tipping point is the initial percent minority in the census tract,
fn =
Qmn
Qmn +Q
w
n
. The second part of the tipping point is the change in the percent minority
that takes the neighborhood to the critical point of the exit function. The key take-away
from equation (1.16) is that the tipping point is directly proportional to the utility tolerance
of non-minorities for minorities, τ , and inversely proportional to the relative preference of
non-minority households for minority neighbors, γw − γm, which in the data is negative. If
τ∗n > 0, then the neighborhood n is a more desirable neighborhood than the alternatives in
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the choice-set. In order for this neighborhood to tip, minorities must move in to lower the
utility of non-minorities to the point where the neighborhood tips. If τ < 0, the opposite
is true, and the tipping point is lower than the current fraction of minorities. One merit of
estimating tipping points in this manner is that it allows researchers to estimate the tipping
point of census tracts that have tipped, that have yet to tip (τ > 0), and that are beyond
their tipping points (τ < 0).
Estimating Preferences
This preference parameter, γw − γm, is identified from the differential sorting of non-
minorities into neighborhoods as a function of the fraction of minorities in the neighborhood.
From equation (1.6), we relate the ratio of the non-minority to minority market share of
a neighborhood to the percent minority in the neighborhood and the relative preference
parameter γw − γm:
log
Ç
Qwn
Qwtot,c
å
− log
Ç
Qmn
Qmtot,c
å
= (γw − γm)
Ç
Qmn
Qmn +Q
,
nw
å
+ en,m (1.17)
The term on the left-hand side is the relative market share of whites to minorities in
neighborhood n. The market share of a neighborhood is the fraction of households in
the MSA of a given type that reside in the neighborhood. Moreover, the log of the market
share is mean utility of an household of the given racial type. The regressor on the right-
hand side is the percent minority in the census tract. By taking the relative market share, I
can difference out characteristics of the neighborhood that are valued equally by minorities
and non-minorities. Here I make the assumption that white and minority households value
everything similarly except the percent minority in the tract.
1.3.4. Semi-Parametric Estimate of Tipping Point
I also use the relative market shares to develop a semi-parametric estimator of the tipping
point, which is non-linear parallel to equation (1.16). In equation (1.17), the relative market
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shares are a linear function of the fraction of minorities, fn. One limitation of this specifi-
cation is that it can produce tipping points that lie outside of the interval [0, 1]. I relax this
assumption by allowing the percent minority in a neighborhood to depend on the relative
market shares in a non-linear fashion. I obtain this relationship, empirically, by regressing
the percent minority in the census tract on powers of the log of the relative market shares:
Qmn
Qmn +Q
w
n
= α0 +
5∑
j=1
αj
ñ
log
Ç
Qwn
Qwtot,c
å
− log
Ç
Qmn
Qmtot,c
åôj
(1.18)
The coefficients of this regression define the inverse mapping from the ratio of the non-
minority to minority market shares to the percent minority in the tract. This inverse
mapping is important because we know the mean utility of white households at the tipping
point, but the ultimate quantity of interest is the percent minority, which defines the tipping
point; therefore we need the inverse mapping of the relative utility to percent minority. I use
the estimated parameters to obtain the percent minority at the tipping point by inserting
a value of Vnw − τ∗nw − Vnm = log
Å
Qwn
Qwtot,c
ã
− log
Å
Qmn
Qmtot,c
ã
− τ∗nw for the relative market share
at the tipping point.
1.4. Data
To estimate the model, I use data from the U.S. census covering five decades: 1970, 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010. This data consists of the demographic characteristics of the house-
holds living in each of the census tracts, as well tract-level measures of the local housing
stock and local economic conditions. The key variables of interest for this study are the
population shares of each census tract broken down by race. Prior work has used similar
data from the 1970–2000 extracts of the census data to compute MSA tipping points (Card
et al. 2008). I build on this work by updating the previous results to include estimates of
tipping points from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. With these five decades of tipping points,
I trace the time evolution of tipping points to show that, over time, tipping points in the
United States have increased. In addition to this empirical contribution, my paper also
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makes a methodological contribution. Whereas these data have been used in Card et. al.
(2008) to compute MSA tipping points, I use these data to compute census tract tipping
points. These tract-level estimates capture the distribution of neighborhood tipping points
within an MSA.
I follow Card et al. (2008) in making the following cuts in the data. First, I eliminate
any tracts whose population growth between consecutive census years surpasses average
population growth in the MSA by more than five standard deviations. Second, I drop all
tracts that experience an increase of more than 500% in their white population between
consecutive census years. These first two cuts reduce the effect of outliers on the results of
this study. For the final cut, I focus my analysis on MSAs that have 100 census tracts or
more, also following Card et al. (2008). There are 123 MSAs that satisfy these criteria, and
these MSAs cover the 38,489 census tracts that comprise my final data set.
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Descriptive Statistics: Racial Preferences
In Table 1, I report the mean, median, and standard deviation of these relative preference
estimates from the “diff-in-diff” procedure of equation (1.17). To compute standard errors
on the point estimate and preference parameters, I use an N=1000 bootstrap. The esti-
mates for γw − γm range from -8.84 in 1970 to -6.11 in 2010. For 1970, the diff-in-diff point
estimate of -8.84 means that a 7.8 percentage point increase in the fraction of minorities
was associated with a 50% reduction in the non-minority population of the average neigh-
borhood. The diff-in-diff point estimate of -6.11 for 2010 indicates that an 11.3 percentage
point increase in the fraction of minorities was needed for the non-minority population in
a neighborhood to halve.
In Figure 2, I graph decadal changes in the distribution of the relative racial preferences.
Each of the kernel density plots uses data from the 5th to 95th percentile to limit the
effect of outliers on the shape of the graphs. In each ten-year period, the distribution
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of preferences shifts to the right, indicating that the mean is decreasing over time. A
decreasing mean over time is consistent with white households becoming more tolerant of
living with minorities. Over time, the distribution of preferences also narrows. This suggests
that, on average, white households’ increase in tolerance is occurring across all levels of the
preference distribution. The compression in the distribution of racial preferences across
cities, over time, is responsible for the declining importance of racial preferences as an
explanatory factor in cross-sectional differences in tipping points across cities.
1.5.2. Descriptive Statistics: Tipping Points
By applying the model to the data, I obtain two sets of census tract tipping points. The
first set comes from the the linear model in equation (1.16), and the second set comes from
the semi-parametric estimator of equation (1.18). Since the predicted outcome of both
approaches is a tipping point that lies in the interval [0,1], an apt analogy for describing
the two methods is that the linear (diff-in-diff method) is analogous to a linear probability
model, while the semi-parametric method is analogous to a non-linear, e.g. probit model,
which produces estimates that lie in the interval [0,1].
Tract Tipping Points
In Table 2, I report summary statistics for the census tract tipping points from the diff-in-
diff method of equation (1.16). The table is divided into three panels. In the first panel I
report the mean, median, and standard deviation of the census tract tipping points for the
full sample in each of the census years. In the second panel I report the identical statistics
for the census tract tipping points that are in the allowable [0,1] range for the given census
year. In the third panel, I report the identical statistics for each census tract that is in range
in 2010. This restriction gives a consistent set of tracts across all census years. Because
some of the tipping points are not “in range,” I use the results from these three panels
as checks that the time trends in the tipping points that I observe are consistent under
the three sample restrictions: the full sample, the sample of tracts that are in range in the
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census year, and a consistent set of tracts that are required to be in range in the 2010 census
year. In Table 3, I present results from the semi-parametric (inverse) method of equation
(1.18).
The mean and median of the census tract tipping points increase monotonically over time
for both the diff-in-diff and the semi-parametric (inverse) mapping methods. Moreover, the
mean tipping point is greater than the median tipping point for all years. The magnitudes of
the estimates are also comparable in both methods. I focus my discussion on the estimates
from the inverse mapping method, because between 98% and 99.6% of the tipping points
for this method are in the allowable [0,1] range.5 For this method the tipping points have
a mean of 15% in 1970, 22% in 1980, 28% in 1990, 36% in 2000, and 41% in 2010. The
median-tract tipping point also monotonically increased from 1970 to 2010. In 1970, the
median-tract tipping point was 13% and by 2010 it was 34%. The inter-censal correlation
between the tract tipping points is between 0.71 and 0.78, as reported in Table 4. This
demonstrates that while the mean tipping points of the tracts has increased over time,
there has been strong persistence in the ranking of tracts across time.
In Figure 3, I report kernel density plots of the tract tipping points in each census year.
The distribution for each year is a single peaked distribution that is left skewed. Over time
the peak pushes out the right, and the distribution flattens and gains more mass in the
right tail. With each succeeding census year the curve shifts out by less, indicating that the
tipping point is increasing at a decreasing rate.
MSA Tipping Points
Using the census tract tipping points, I construct two measures of MSA tipping points. The
first is a mean MSA tipping point and the second is a median MSA tipping point. The
mean MSA tipping point is the average tipping point of the census tracts in the MSA. The
median MSA tipping point is the median census tract tipping point in the MSA. In Table 5,
5By comparison, only 57%–84% of the diff-in-diff linear estimates are in range. Nevertheless, the results
in the second panel of Table 2 agree with the results in the inverse mapping method for all years.
17
I report the mean, median, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, and 75th percentile of the mean
MSA tipping points for all MSAs and also broken down by geographic region – Northeast,
Midwest, South, and West. The results in Table 6 are for the median MSA tipping points.
From 1970 to 2010, both MSA tipping points increased monotonically over time. In 1970
the mean MSA tipping point was 11%; by 2010 it rose to 33%. This increase in the MSA
tipping points over time was undergirded by an increasing time trend in tipping points in
all regions of the US. MSA tipping points in the West increased fastest, at a rate of 7.5
percentage points per decade, while MSA tipping points increased slowest in the Midwest
- 3.25 percentage points per decade. The distribution of tipping points in the Northeast
parallels the distribution of MSA tipping points in the Midwest. The mean tipping points
in both regions over time were (9%/9%) (12%/12%), (15%/14%), (22%/19%), (26%/22%)
in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively. Likewise, the MSA tipping points in the
South mirrored those in the West.
The MSA tipping points exhibited a high degree of correlation across consecutive census
periods (0.89–0.98), notwithstanding the fact that they increased substantially across time
(Table 7). One striking fact about the MSA tipping points is that the mean MSA tipping
points and the median MSA tipping points had very similar distributions. For example,
in the full sample the mean of the mean MSA tipping points and the mean of the median
MSA tipping points were (13%/11%), (18%/16%), (22%/21%), (30%/28%), and (35%/33%)
in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively. For each year the difference between
the mean and the median MSA tipping points was between 1 and 2 percentage points.6
Moreover, the mean of the mean MSA tipping points is similar to the median of the census
tract tipping points. I exploit this fact in the next section, where I show that the tipping
points estimated by Card et al. (2008) are similar to the local mean and the local median
of the tipping points of the marginal census tracts in the MSA.
6By comparison, the mean and median of the census tract tipping points were more dissimilar (15%/13%),
(22%/16%), (28%/21%), (36%/28%), and (41%/34%) in the respective census years. For each year the
difference between the mean and the median tract tipping points is between 2 and 8 percentage points.
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1.5.3. Comparison with Prior Estimates of Tipping Points
The Card et al. 2008 (CMR) tipping points cover three decades – 1970, 1980, and 1990. On
average, the tipping points that I get are 3 percentage points higher in 1970, 9 percentage
points higher in 1980, and 12 percentage points higher in 1990 than CMR. This difference
occurs because the two tipping points capture different aspects of the underlying distribution
of census tract tipping points. The MSA tipping points that I report are an average of the
underlying census tract tipping points, which I am able to estimate because I model the
location decision of households within the MSA and use the counter-factual exercise to
obtain census tract tipping points. The CMR approach accurately measures a local average
of the marginal census tracts (i.e., tracts that are close to the tipping threshold). This
distinction between the two MSA tipping points is evident from the theories guiding their
construction.
The CMR tipping points are the result of a fixed-point procedure. To obtain the MSA
tipping point, the CMR fits a polynomial of the change in the percent of whites between
census years (above the MSA average) as a function of the fraction of minorities in the base
census year. Each observation used to fit this function is a census tract in the MSA which
is appears into consecutive periods. The first method for determining the tipping point is
to solve for the zeros of this polynomial. The key point is that tracts below the tipping
point experience above-average growth in their white populations, whereas tracts beyond
the tipping point experience below average growth in their non-minority populations. The
minority fraction at the zero of this polynomial is taken to be the MSA tipping point.
In cases where there are multiple zeros, the authors took the zero that delivered the most
negative first derivative. This equilibrium selection procedure parallels the approach that I
take in this paper, where for each tract I stipulate that the tipping point occurs at the level
of utility for which the exit rate of non-minorities is maximal (and the marginal exit rate
equals zero). Since the CMR tipping point is the zero of a fitted polynomial, it depends
crucially on the behavior of the census tracts in the vicinity of this zero. I call these
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census tracts the “marginal census tracts.” These are tracts that are close to their tipping
points. I call tracts that are farther away from the zero of the polynomial “infra-marginal
census tracts.” Changes in the behavior the infra-marginal tracts have less bearing on the
estimated value of the CMR MSA tipping points.
The setup of the CMR procedure suggests that the CMR tipping points are local averages of
the tipping points of the marginal tracts, or perhaps the median of the tipping points of the
marginal census tracts in the MSA. Since I have estimates of tipping points for each census
tract in an MSA, I can test the hypothesis that the CMR tipping points are local averages
of the tipping points of marginal census tracts or the median of the tipping points of the
marginal tracts. In Table 8, I present results from a regression of the difference between the
CMR and Blair MSA tipping points, which I call the tipping difference,7 and the fraction of
marginal census tracts in the MSA. Here, a marginal census tract is a tract whose percent
minority is within 5 percentage points of its estimated tract tipping point. For example, if
a tract has a tipping point of 35% and a current percent minority of 32% it is considered
a marginal tract. Likewise, if another tract in the same MSA has a tipping point of 7%
and a current percent minority of 11%, I also consider it a marginal tract. To allow for
asymmetry in the impact of marginal tracts that lie to the left and to the right of their
respective tipping points, I include separate explanatory variables for (a) the fraction of
tracts in the MSA that are marginal and have minority fractions below their tipping points;
and (b) the fraction of tracts in the MSA that are marginal and have minority fractions
greater than their tipping points.
The constant terms from the regressions in Table 8 capture the mean tipping difference.
In 1990, the tipping difference was -15%. It was -10% in 1980 and -8% in 1970. These
regression results accord with the -13%, -9%, and -3% tipping differences from the raw
data. Based on the regression results, the marginal tracts that were below the tipping point
7I do not call this quantity a bias because my hypothesis is that the CMR tipping points measure the
distribution of the marginal census tracts, which in and of itself is an important quantity. We care about
which tracts are marginal and how the distribution of marginal tracts varies across time and across space.
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drove the tipping difference in 1990 and 1980. In 1970, the marginal tracts that were above
the tipping point (i.e., those that had already tipped), drove the tipping difference. One
reason there is a tipping difference at all is that there were few marginal tracts, and so an
average of the marginal tracts was different from an average of all tracts. To illustrate this
point, I combine the constant term from the regression and the significant coefficient on the
marginal tracts to compute the threshold fraction of marginal tracts, f˜ required for there
to be no tipping difference in each year:
f˜ =
# marginal tracts in MSA
Total # tracts in MSA
. (1.19)
To solve for f˜ , I set the sum the constant term from the regression and the product of the
(significant) coefficient on the marginal tracts times f˜ equal to zero. At this value of f˜ , the
tipping difference is zero, and the CMR tipping points and the tipping points that I obtain
are equal. In 1990, 72% of the tracts would have to be marginal for there to be no tipping
difference. In 1980, 53% of the tracts would have to be marginal; and in 1970, 13% of tracts
would have to be marginal. In the reality, the average MSA consisted of 14% of marginal
tracts (below) in 1990, 13% of marginal tracts (below) in 1980, and 11% of marginal tracts
(above) in 1970. Since the mean number of marginal tracts was closest to the required level
in 1970, it is not surprising that the tipping difference was smallest in 1970. The opposite is
true for 1990, the year when the difference between the required threshold and the fraction
of tracts that were marginal was largest.
The results of Figure 5 and Figure 6 further illustrate the point that the CMR tipping
points are a local mean or median of the tipping points of the marginal census tracts. In
both Figure 5 and Figure 6, there are three panels, one each for 1970, 1980, and 1990. The
dashed line in each panel of Figure 5 is a kernel density plot of the tipping difference using
all tracts. The solid line in each plot is a kernel density plot of the tipping difference using
only the marginal tracts that were predicted to explain the tipping difference. For example,
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in 1980, the tipping difference using only marginal tracts is the difference between the CMR
tipping point (unmodified) and the mean of the census tracts, which are to the left of the
tipping points, with the means of marginal tipping points computed by MSA. For each year,
the dashed line peaks to the left of zero. This reflects the fact that the CMR tipping points
are, on average, smaller than the tipping points that I get when I compute means using all
census tracts in an MSA. On the other hand, in every year, the solid line peaks near zero.
This reflects the fact that the tipping difference disappears when I compute MSA tipping
points using only the marginal tracts. With this sample restriction, the tipping difference
of the median MSA is reduced from -11.2% to -2.4% in 1990, from -7.8% to -1.1% in 1980,
and from -3.7% to 1.9% in 1970. This suggests that the CMR tipping points are a local
average of the tipping points of the marginal census tracts, as hypothesized.
To verify this, I perform a similar exercise, this time changing the definition of the tipping
difference to be the difference between the CMR tipping point and the tipping point of the
median census tract in each MSA. When I restrict the sample to only the marginal tracts,
the tipping difference equals the difference between the CMR tipping point and the median
tipping point of the marginal census tracts. Apart from this change in the definition of the
tipping difference, Figure 6 is laid out identically to Figure 5. The dashed lines peak to
the left of zero, reflecting the fact that the CMR tipping points are smaller, on average,
than the MSA tipping points that I compute from the median. The solid lines, however,
peak even more sharply around zero than the solid lines using the mean. This reflects the
fact that the tipping difference also disappears when I compute MSA tipping points using
only the marginal tracts. With this sample restriction, the tipping difference of the median
MSA is reduced from -11.2% to -1.7% in 1990, from -7.8% to 0.1% in 1980, and does not
substantively change in magnitude in 1970 (from -3.7% to 4%). Taking the best of the local
mean and median results, the tipping difference of the median MSA is bounded above by
1.9% and bounded below by -0.1%. These results provide further support for the hypothesis
that the CMR tipping points capture the shape of the distribution of marginal census tracts
in an MSA.
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From this comparison of marginal and infra-marginal tracts, we learn that the tipping points
of the marginal census tracts evolve more slowly over time than those of the infra-marginal
tracts. The CMR tipping points, which were shown to be an average of the marginal
tipping points, increased an average of 1 percentage point per decade (1970–1990). We
also learn that the infra-marginal tracts play an important role in the secular time trend of
tipping points. The MSA tipping points using all tracts (both marginal and infra-marginal)
increased at an average rate of 5.5 percentage points per decade (1970–2010), which is
substantially higher than the growth rate of the tipping points of infra-marginal tracts. An
important contribution of the method in this paper is that it enables researchers to compute
the tipping points of all census tracts and derived MSA tipping points, which are aggregates
of the underlying census tract tipping points. The dynamics of these MSA tipping points
better reflect the dynamics of the underlying census tracts.8
1.5.4. Results: Preferences versus Outside Options
The motivating insight of this paper is that outside options affect the ability of households
to act on their preferences for neighborhood racial composition. A household may remain
in a neighborhood despite its racial composition if the outside options do not offer higher
utility. The reverse is also true – a household may exit its current neighborhood because
of the availability of desirable alternative neighborhoods in its city. For each census year,
I decompose the mean MSA tipping point into a component due to the mean preferences
of the households and a measure of their outside options, which depends on the extent of
clustering in the city by race.
To measure minority clustering, I use a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that is stan-
dardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. To compute the index,
I construct the minority market share of each census tract n in a given census year y by
dividing the number of minorities in the tract by the total number of minorities in its MSA
8The mean tipping point of census tracts in the data increased by 6.75 percentage points per decade
(1970–2010)
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c: scn,m,y =
Qcn,m,y
Qctot,m,y
. I then square the minority market shares, sn,m,y and sum over them
for each MSA, c, to get the MSA HHIc : HHIc =
∑
n(s
c
n,m,y)
2.(1.20)To finish, I de-mean
the Minority HHI and normalize it to have variance 1 in each year. This yields a minority
HHI z-score,(HHIcm,z,y) for each MSA for each census year from 1970 to 2010. I construct a
standardized non-minority HHI using an identical procedure (HHIcw,z,y). To construct the
standardized measure of racial preferences, (∆γcz,y), I de-mean the relative marginal utility
for minority neighbors from the diff-in-diff procedure of equation (1.17) and normalize it to
have standard deviation 1.
A one standard deviation decrease in the minority HHI corresponds to less clustering of
minorities in the MSA, or more census tracts in the MSA having some minority house-
holds. Less clustering of minorities creates a choice-set in which many census tracts are
sprinkled with at least some minorities, making it difficult for non-minority households to
sort into all-white neighborhoods. A one standard deviation increase in the non-minority
HHI corresponds to more clustering of non-minorities into fewer census tracts within an
MSA. Greater clustering of non-minorities creates a choice-set that is bimodal, with some
tracts having many non-minorities and others having few non-minorities. A one standard
deviation increase in the race preferences is associated with non-minorities having prefer-
ences for minority neighbors that is more similar to the preferences that minorities have for
minority neighbors.
In Table 9, I report the results of a regression of mean MSA tipping points (T cy ) on the
minority HHI (HHIcm,z,y), the non-minority HHI (HHI
c
w,z,y), and the standardized race
preferences (∆γcz,y):
T cy = η
y
1HHI
c
m,z,y + η
y
2HHI
c
w,z,y + φ
y∆γcz,y. (1.21)
Since the tipping points were constructed using the choice-set faced by households and
the estimated preferences, I read this regression as providing a decomposition of the MSA
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tipping points into a component due to the configuration of the outside option and the
mean preferences in the MSA. The results of this regression are summarized in Figure 7.
The first result is that less minority clustering, or having the presence of a more diverse
choice-set, is associated with a higher tipping point. In 1970, for example, a one standard
deviation decrease in the minority HHI results in a η19701 = 1.1 percentage point increase in
the tipping point. From 1970 to 2010, this effect of a reduction in minority clustering on
mean MSA tipping points strengthens monotonically. By 2010, a one standard deviation
decrease in minority clustering increases the mean tipping point by 14 percentage points,
which is roughly 50% of the base tipping point of 30% in 2010. Since reductions in the
clustering of minorities result in many tracts having at least some minorities, this reduces
the number of all-white tracts, which in turn creates a barrier to neighborhood exit by
non-minorities.
Increasing the clustering of non-minorities has no statistically significant effect on MSA tip-
ping points in 1970. In 1980, however, a one standard deviation increase the non-minority
HHI increases the tipping point by 2.6 percentage points or 15%. By 2010, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the non-minority HHI is associated with a 11.2 percentage point
increase in the tipping point. When the non-minority HHI increases, non-minorities are
clustered in fewer census tracts. This creates a bimodal distribution of tracts by racial
composition. There are fewer tracts with some non-minorities because of the increased
clustering of minorities; and there are more tracts with higher minority fractions also be-
cause of the clustering. Both of these factors act as barriers to the exit of non-minorities
from neighborhoods, resulting in an increasing tipping point. Hence both the diffusion of
minorities through the MSA by a decrease in the minority HHI and an increase in the clus-
tering of non-minorities by an increase in the non-minority HHI are associated with greater
tipping points in the cross-section. This effect also strengthens over time, as illustrated by
the non-zero slope of the HHI coefficients over time in Figure 7.
While the role of outside options becomes increasingly important over time, the role of racial
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preferences diminishes. This is illustrated by the negative downward slope of the racial
preferences coefficients. In 1970, a one standard deviation increase in racial preferences
was associated with a φ1970 = 6.6 percentage point increase in the tipping point, which
equals a more than 50% increase in the tipping point. In 2010, a one standard deviation
increase in racial preferences had no effect on the tipping point. The decline in the effect
of racial preferences on the tipping point is nearly monotonic over time. Interestingly, 1970
and 2010 are opposite sides of the coin when it comes to the respective roles of racial
preferences and outside options in MSA tipping points. In 1970, the clustering of minorities
and non-minorities had a small effect on tipping points, whereas racial preferences were
at the zenith of their importance. In 2010, the opposite was true – the configuration of
the outside options was paramount, and racial preferences appear to have played no role
in explaining cross-sectional differences in MSA tipping points. With the configuration
of a household’s choice-set mattering more now than in the past, modeling the tipping
with outside options, as I do here, is of principal importance in understanding the future
evolution of city tipping points.
1.6. Conclusion
A neighborhood tips when non-minorities exit in response to integration. Prior literature
has focused on racial preferences as a key driver for tipping. I show that in addition, the
outside options of households also matter. To incorporate outside options into a model
of tipping, I start with the assumption that a household’s outside options are the other
neighborhoods in its city of residence. I further require that a household’s response to
integration is incentive compatible – the household only exits its current neighborhood if
relocating delivers higher utility than staying. I pair this assumption about the choice-set
and the incentive compatibility constraint with a discrete choice model in order to exploit
the sub-MSA sorting patterns in the data to estimate census tract tipping points.
The census tract tipping points that I estimate reveal two key findings. First, tipping points
we learn that tipping points have increased over time by more than previously thought. This
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result also holds when I aggregate the tract tipping points at the MSA level. Prior estimates
in the literature pegged the growth in city tipping points at an average of 1 percentage
point per decade, whereas I find that city tipping points have grown by an average rate of 5
percentage points per decade. I show that my estimates of city tipping points are different
from the prior literature because the city tipping points that I estimate are an average of
the underlying distribution of tract tipping points. The CMR tipping points appear to be
local averages of the tipping points of census tracts that are close to tipping.
The second key finding of this paper is that outside options are increasingly important
for explaining cross-sectional variation in tipping points. In 1970, a one standard deviation
increase in the diffusion of minorities across a city was associated with a 1 percent increase in
the tipping point. By 2010, a similar change in the outside option was associated with a 14
percentage point increase in the tipping point. By contrast, differences in racial preferences
have become less important for explaining cross-sectional differences in city tipping points.
From a policy standpoint, the distinction between preferences and outside options is im-
portant. If heterogeneity in tipping points were driven primarily by racial preferences, then
the government would require policy levers that change preferences in order to mitigate
neighborhood tipping. If, on the other hand, heterogeneity in tipping points were due to
differences in the outside options of households, then this would provide more scope for
place-based policies to promote integration. The results of this study suggest that the lat-
ter is the case, since the effect of outside options has become larger over time, while the
effect of racial preferences on tipping points has diminished in significance.
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CHAPTER 2 : Why Don’t Elite Colleges Expand Supply?
Abstract: While both the skills premium and the demand for elite colleges have increased
over time, elite colleges have not increased supply to capture these profits, instead choosing
to reduce their acceptance rates. We propose a model in which colleges compete on relative
selectivity as an explanation for this puzzle. There are two equilibria of this game: one in
which elite colleges coordinate on a low admissions rate and another in which elite colleges
coordinate on a high, Pareto dominant, admissions rate. In the low equilibrium, increased
demand reduces the admissions rate. The opposite is true in the high equilibrium. We take
the model to data using recent admissions statistics for Harvard, Yale and Princeton (2003-
2015). We find that the colleges play the low equilibrium, which results in an average annual
loss of $73M in social surplus for each school. For comparison, the loss in social surplus
resulting from the low equilibrium play is 50% larger than the size of the dead weight loss
($47M) in the standard monopoly case where Harvard, Yale and Princeton (HYP) have no
preferences over relative prestige. From a policy standpoint, allowing schools to collude on
their admissions rates could be Pareto improving if this collusion results in the adoption of
the high equilibrium admissions rate.
2.1. Introduction
In 1979, the incoming class of Yale College freshmen stood at 1,346 students (Walters,
2001). In 2014, the size of the incoming class of Yale College freshmen stood at 1,360
students.1 Over the same period, the number of applications to Yale College more than
tripled from 9,331 students in 1979 to 30,932 in 2014. Across the Ivy League and its peer
institutions, the story is the same story– an increasing demand for spaces by increasingly
more qualified students 2 with little change in the supply of spots. In Figures 8 and 9, we
provide plots of the number of applicants and the number of admitted students at each
1The peak enrollment at Yale College from 1979 to 2014 was 1409 students in 2000 and the minimum
enrollment was 1255 students in 1986.
2At Yale College, the inter-quartile range of the SAT Math of admitted students increased from 620-730
(1975) to 710-790 (2014) and likewise for Sat Verbal from 670-780 (1975) to 710-800 (2014).
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undergraduate college of the eight Ivy League universities during the past 13 years. They
all demonstrate a pattern of rapidly increasing number of applications and stable number of
students admitted. Given the increasing returns to education for students, and particularly
to education at elite colleges, and the increasing endowments due to alumni contributions, it
is a puzzle that elite colleges have not expanded supply in the past four decades (Blackburn
and Neumark 1993, Hoxby 2000, Katz and Murphy 1992, Baum et. al 2010, Long 2007).
One potential explanation for this puzzle is that elite universities face a hard supply con-
straint. The existence of a hard supply constraint may explain why elite universities in city
centers, for example Columbia University and the University of Pennsylvania, have not ap-
preciably increased the size of their undergraduate population. This explanation, however,
is less convincing for schools like Stanford University3 and Duke University, where available
land is plentiful.
Another alternative explanation to this puzzle is that elite schools have not expanded supply
in order to maintain the quality of the student body. This explanation is also unlikely given
the increased quality of the applicant pool at elite schools documented in Hoxby (2009).
For example, from 1970-2000, the number of applicants to Stanford with Math scores > 700
increased by a factor of 2.3 (Hennessey 2007).
The solution to this puzzle, which we offer in this paper, is that elite schools have not
expanded supply because of competitive pressure. In our model, when deciding whether
to expand the supply of spaces in its entering class, colleges face the following important
trade-off: by adding more students, there is the possibility that this increases profits. On
balance, adding more students could also lead to the college becoming less selective by
increasing its admissions rate relative to that of its peer institutions. We show that when
elite colleges compete over relative prestige, which we define as the ratio of the college’s
admissions rate to the average admissions rate of schools in its peer group, this leads to
3In 1970, Stanford received 9,800 applications and had a class size of 1,555 students. In 2014, Stanford
received 42,167 applications and had a class size of 1,691.
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a “prestige externality” that produces multiple equilibria. In our simple case, we take the
N ≥ 2 competing colleges to be identical in their preferences over relative prestige.4 We
find that this prestige game yields two competitive equilibria – one in which the admissions
rate of colleges is low (a¯L) and the other in which admissions rates are high (a¯H).
5
Since all colleges are identical in the model, in the low admissions rate equilibrium, all
colleges coordinate on an identical admissions rate, resulting in zero net utility from relative
prestige at the equilibrium admissions rate. The same is true of each college’s actions in
the high admissions rate equilibrium. The Pareto ranking of the two equilibria is therefore
driven by the differences in net profits between the high and low admissions rate equilibrium.
The high admissions rate equilibrium yields a larger producer surplus for colleges since the
high admissions rate equilibrium takes the colleges closer to the monopoly admissions rate
in which the college places zero weight on relative prestige. Furthermore, students are also
better off under the high admissions rate equilibrium since more students are admitted;
moreover, conditional on being admitted, students pay a lower price because each college
faces a downward slopping demand curve.
In the low admissions equilibrium, the model predicts that increases in demand results in
decreased admissions rates, whereas the opposite is true in the high admissions equilibrium.
We use this comparative static to take the model to data using Harvard, Yale and Princeton
(HYP) as a group of nearly identical colleges. The main result is that HYP schools play the
Pareto-dominated low admissions rate equilibrium in which both consumers and producers
are worse-off relative to the high admission rate equilibria. Moreover, in the low equilibrium,
the social surplus is shared in a ratio that differentially favors producers (colleges) relative
to consumers (students) at a ratio of 14.4 to 1, rather than 3.2 to 1 for the high equilibrium.
To put a very conservative lower bound on the loss in social surplus, we use the sticker price
of tuition as the maximum willingness to pay of students. At the HYP schools, between
4We extend our key results to the heterogeneous case in the Appendix.
5We show that an equilibrium exists for a given range of parameter values.
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30% to 40% of students receive no financial aid, which makes using the sticker price of the
college a reasonable lower bound on the maximum willingness-to-pay. Using this value of
the maximum WTP, we find that the loss in social surplus from playing the low equilibrium
is bounded below by $73M annually for each of the three universities. The individual schools
shoulder $49M of the loss in social surplus, with students shouldering the remaining $23M
in lost social surplus. To put this loss into context, if HYP placed zero weight on the relative
prestige, but acted as a profit maximizing monopolist, the dead weight loss would be $47M
(per school). Consequently, the loss in social surplus due to the low equilibrium play is 55%
greater than the deadweight loss.6 One important policy implication of our model is that
allowing schools to collude on their admissions rates would be Pareto improving.
The analysis in this paper is complementary to the work by Hoxby (2009), who provides a
demand-side explanation for the increasing selectivity of elite colleges. Hoxby shows student
preferences for colleges have changed over time from preferring local colleges to preferring
non-regional schools. This increased student mobility has lead to students applying more to
elite institutions. This explains why application numbers have increased. Our paper posits
an explanation for why supply has not correspondingly increased. In many models in the
literature, it is common to assume that the number of spaces at a college are fixed (Chade
et. al 2014, Avery and Levin 2010, and Fu 2014). In our model, we do not restrict the
supply of spaces, but instead assume a constant marginal cost for each additional student.
By endogenizing equilibrium supply, we can test whether preferences over relative prestige
can explain the puzzle of stable supply in the face of increasing demand.
2.2. Model
The model consist of a two stage game. In the first stage of the game, students decide
whether to apply to a given college and in the second stage of the game colleges decide how
6The loss in consumer is particularly important from a policy standpoint because minority students
differentially benefit more from attending elite schools (Dale and Krueger, 2002, 2011) yet they are under-
represented at many elite schools. Reardon et. al show that whites in the top half of the income distribution
are 3 times more likely to attend a selective school than African-Americans of the same socio-economic
status.
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many students to admit given the college’s objective function.
2.2.1. Student Demand for College Admission
To gain traction on modeling the number of students who apply to a given college, we
assume that demand for each college is linear, such that a given school i faces an inverse
demand function of the form:
Pi = P0,i − biQi, (2.1)
where P0,i is the willingness to pay of the student with the highest valuation for college i and
bi is the inverse of the price sensitivity of demand. To determine the number of students
applying to a school, we assume that students only apply to a college if the student’s
willingness to pay is greater than the cost of the application fee, Papp,i. Since in practice
most colleges offer fee waivers for students with financial need, the marginal student is a
student whose willingness to pay equals zero. Hence the number of students applying to a
school is given by:
0 = P0,i − biQ∗i =⇒ Q∗i =
P0,i
bi
. (2.2)
2.2.2. Supply Decision of Colleges
There are N ≥ 2 distinct colleges. Each school, indexed by i, has utility over its relative
prestige and financial earnings. The relative prestige of the college takes the form of the
ratio of the college’s admissions rate ai relative to the average admissions rate of the other
colleges in its peer group a¯−i = 1N−1
∑
k 6=i ak. We define the admissions rate as the ratio
of the number of the students who are accepted to college i to the number of student who
have applied: ai =
qi
Qi
. The college’s financial earnings take the form of total revenue minus
total cost, where we assume that the inverse demand for slots is linear and the marginal
cost of producing an additional slot at the college is a constant, ci. The college’s utility
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function takes the form:
Vi = ri
ñ
1−
Ç
ai
a¯−i
åô
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Monetary Value of Relative Prestige
+ (P0,i − biqi)qi − ciqi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits
. (2.3)
The first term of Vi is the monetary value of relative prestige. If the college has an admissions
rate that equals the mean of its peer group then its relative prestige is zero in monetary
terms. If, on the other hand, the college has an admissions rate that is twice that of the
mean of its peers, then it incurs a prestige penalty equal to −ri. The second term of Vi is
the financial profits that the college can earn due to its price setting ability. The college,
therefore, faces a trade-off in determining how many students to admit: admitting more
students can potentially lead to greater profits, but it potentially lowers the college’s relative
prestige vis-a`-vis that of its peers.
2.2.3. Solving the Model
First Order Conditions
The college chooses qi to maximize utility. This yields the following first order condition:
0 = − ri
a¯−i
+ (P0,i − c)Qi − 2aibiQ2i . (2.4)
Best Response Functions
We rewrite the first order condition to obtain the best response function, ai(a¯−i), in terms
of two economically meaningful quantities (i) the no-prestige monopoly admissions rate:
θi =
P0,i − ci
2bQi
, (2.5)
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which is the utility maximizing admissions rate for the case where ri = 0 and college i has
no utility over relative prestige; and (ii) the prestige ratio:
λ =
ri
(P0,i−ci)2
2b
, (2.6)
which is the ratio of the prestige weight, ri, to the social surplus generated from college i
setting price equal to marginal cost. Given that its peers have an average admissions rate
of ai(a¯−i), college i has a best response of:
ai(a¯−i) = θi − λi
Ç
θ2i
a¯−i
å
. (2.7)
The best response exhibits three important properties. College i ’s best response function is:
(i). increasing in average admissions rate of its peers a¯−i (ii). decreasing in its own prestige
ratio, λi (iii). increasing in the no-prestige monopoly admissions rate (at a decreasing rate)
if the average admissions rate of its peers is sufficiently large, i.e. a¯−i > 2λθ.
Nash Equilibria in Case of N Identical Colleges
We now use the best response functions to solve for the equilibria of this game in the
case of N identical colleges. The equilibrium solution concept that we employ is the Nash
equilibrium in which each school is best responding to the admissions decisions of its peers.
One important feature of the special case of the model is that in equilibrium each school
plays an identical admissions rate because of the symmetry of the problem. Consequently,
at the Nash equilibrium a∗i = a¯∗−i. Evaluating the best response function in equation (2.7)
at the equilibrium, a∗i = a¯∗−i, we find that the admissions rate in equilibrium takes on one
of two values:
a∗i,± = a¯
∗
−i,± =
θ
2
Ä
1±√1− 4λ
ä
(2.8)
We will refer to a∗i,+ as the high equilibrium, or a¯H and we will refer to a∗i,− as the low
equilibrium, or a¯L. Both the low and the high equilibrium are increasing in the no-prestige
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monopoly admissions rate, θ. Increasing the prestige ratio, λ, however, has opposing ef-
fects on the low and high equilibria. In the low equilibrium increasing the prestige ratio
increases the equilibrium admissions rate, whereas in the high equilibrium, increasing the
prestige ratio decreases the equilibrium admissions rate. The intuition for this result is the
following. Changes in the admissions rate affect utility through the prestige component of
the utility and through the profit component of the utility function. A one percent change
in a college’s admissions rate relative to its peers has a constant return of 0.01r from the
prestige component of utility and a non-linear return coming from the profit component
of the college’s utility function. Given the concavity of the profit function, the return to
increasing the admissions rate is greatest when the admissions rate is low and is smallest
when the admissions rate is high.
Conditions for FOCs to Hold
In order for the first order conditions to hold, it must be the case that there is a real
valued admissions rate that satisfies equation (2.8). When λ > 14 , the equilibrium is ill-
defined because the FOC generating equation (2.8) is not satisfied for a real number. When
λ > 14 , there is always exists a profitable deviation from playing at an interior point. In
particular, it is profitable for a college to undercut its competitors by playing an action
ai <
Ä
1− 14λ
ä
a¯−i. This deviation generates a utility that is greater than one quarter the
social surplus generated by perfect competition, which itself is an upper bound on the
profits from playing the monopoly admissions rate.7 Therefore, in cases where λ > 14 ,
colleges compete down towards a corner solution of a∗ = 0.
2.2.4. Conditions for Interior Solutions
The equilibria in equation (2.8) result in an interior solution a∗i,+ ∈ (0, 1) for the following
range of no prestige monopoly admission rates: 0 < θ < 1. The no prestige monopoly rate is
parametrized by the ratio of the marginal cost c to the maximum willingness to pay P0. We
7There is no corner solution at a∗ = 1, since this would require schools to produce below marginal cost
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arrive at this parametrization by substituting the expression for the number of applicants
in equation (2.2) into the expression for no prestige monopoly admissions rate in equation
(2.5). The no prestige monopoly admissions rate is the following function of the parameters
of the model:
θ =
1
2
− c
2P0
. (2.9)
The no-prestige monopoly admissions rate is bounded above by 12 because of the assumption
of linear marginal cost and the assumption that only students with non-negative willingness
to pay apply to the college. In cases where θ < 0, the marginal cost c exceeds the maximum
willingness to pay P0 and colleges set the supply of spaces equal to zero and hence the
equilibrium admissions rate is zero. Cases where θ > 1 correspond to either negative
marginal cost (c < 0) or negative maximum willingness to pay (P0 < 0). Negative marginal
cost would assume that colleges receive a subsidy for supplying spaces which would exceed
the college’s actual cost of supplying the space. Negative maximal willingness to pay would
suggest that there is no demand for college except that colleges are willing to pay all students
to attend.
Remark: By imposing the condition 0 < θ < 1, we rule out negative marginal cost,
negative maximum willingness to pay and we also rule out a scenario in which the maximum
willingness to pay is less than the constant marginal cost.
Second Order Conditions
The second order condition for a maximum requires that the Hessian matrix of second
derivatives, H, be negative semi-definite. For the case of N identical colleges, the Hessian
is parametrized by two terms, α, its diagonal entries:
α =
∂2Vi
∂q2i
= −2b︸︷︷︸
<0
. (2.10)
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and its off-diagonal entries:
β =
∂2Vi
∂qj∂qi
=
1
(N − 1)
r
(Qda¯)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (2.11)
This simple parametrization of the Hessian follows from the symmetry of the best response
functions. To test that the second order condition is satisfied, we first write the Hessian in
compact matrix notation using (α, β):
Hi =
∂
∂~q
Å
∂Vi
∂~q
ã
= (α− β)IN×N + β~eN × (~eN )†, (2.12)
where IN×N is the N-by-N identity matrix, ~eN is a column vector of N ones. For H, to be
negative semi-definite, we require that x†Hx ≤ 0 for all vectors ~x = (x1, x2, ..., xn). This
condition is satisfied when the following inequality holds:
α
N∑
n=1
x2n − β
Ñ
N∑
n=1
x2n −
[
N∑
n=1
xn
]2é
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0. (2.13)
The second order condition is satisfied at the Nash equilibria since we know from equations
(2.10) and (2.11) that α < 0 and β > 0.
2.3. Welfare Analysis
The model generates two equilibria {aL, aH}, which are described in equation (2.8). To
quantify the efficiency properties of these equilibria, we examine the consumer surplus, the
producer surplus and the total social surplus under each equilibrium. Since we observe
that colleges play the low admissions rate equilibrium, we benchmark the surplus for both
consumers and producers in the low-admissions rate equilibrium, against the counter-factual
surpluses under the high-admissions rate equilibrium. We also include welfare calculations
for the consumer, producer and social surpluses for the setting in which colleges have no
preferences over relative prestige (λ = 0) and the admissions rate is the monopoly admissions
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rate θ. In this setting there is just one equilibrium, the monopoly admissions rate. The
monopoly case allows us to tease apart how much of the welfare losses are due to elite
schools having preferences for relative prestige.
2.3.1. Consumer Surplus
In a given equilibrium, the admissions rate is a¯ ∈ {a¯L, a¯H} and Qd students have applied to
each of the N identical schools. The college, which faces a downward sloping demand, sets
an equilibrium price P(Qda¯). Accordingly, the consumer surplus under this equilibrium is
the area between the demand curve and the equilibrium price:
CS =
1
2
[P0 − P (Qda¯)]Qda¯
=
1
2
(P0 − P0 + bQda¯)Qda¯.
=
1
2
(bQd)Qda¯
2.
For convenience, we further simplify the consumer surplus by writing it in units of the
maximum willingness to pay P0. This simplification comes from imposing the condition that
all students with non-negative willingness to pay for college do indeed apply, i.e. Qd =
P0
b .
This condition arised in equation (2.2) where we modeled consumer demand. The final
expression for the consumer surplus in units of P0 is:
CS(a¯) =
Ç
a¯2
2
å
Qd . (2.14)
The consumer surplus increases quadratically in the admissions rate. Consequently, con-
sumer surplus is lower when colleges coordinate on the low admissions rate a¯L rather
than on the high admissions rate aH . We define the difference in consumer surplus that
arises when colleges play the low equilibrium instead of the high admissions equilibrium as
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∆CSL,H ≡ CS(a¯L)− CS(a¯H). The difference in consumer surplus is given by:
∆CSL,H = −1
2
Qd(a¯H − a¯L)(a¯H + a¯L).
The larger the difference between the high and the low equilibrium, the greater the loss in
consumer surplus that results from colleges playing the low instead of the high equilibrium.
The sum of the high and low equilibrium equals the monopoly admissions rate, i.e a¯H+a¯L =
θ, as in equation (2.8). Hence the loss in consumer surplus is:
∆CSL,H = −
Ç
θ(a¯H − a¯L)
2
å
Qd . (2.15)
From equation (2.15), the difference in the consumer surplus is also increasing in the
monopoly admissions rate. Intuitively, the greater the admissions rate at a college in the
absence of preferences over relative prestige, the greater the loss in consumer surplus when
the college and its peers coordinate on the low, rather than the high, equilibrium, in the
case where they place positive weight on relative prestige.
2.3.2. Producer Surplus
In a given equilibrium, the admissions rate a¯ ∈ {aL, aH} is the same for all N identical
colleges. The relative prestige portion of a college’s utility function, therefore, always equals
zero in equilibrium. The college, which faces a downward sloping demand and operates at
a constant marginal cost, c, sets an equilibrium price P(Qda¯). Accordingly, the producer
surplus under this equilibrium is the area between the equilibrium price and the constant
marginal cost:
PS = [P (Qda¯)− c]Qda¯
=
1
2
(P0 − bQda¯− c)Qda¯
=
1
2
(bQd)
ï
P0 − c
bQd
− a¯
ò
Qda¯.
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As we did with the consumer surplus, we further simplify the producer surplus by writing
it in units of the maximum willingness to pay P0. The term bQd equals P0 from equation
(2.2). Moreover, the term in parentheses P0−cbQd equals twice the monopoly admissions rate,
θ; hence the producer surplus is:
PS(a¯) = Qd (2θ − a¯) a¯. (2.16)
The producer surplus is also a quadratic in the equilibrium admissions rate. The producer
surplus equals zero when the equilibrium admissions rate is zero, i.e. a¯ = 0. Moreover, the
producer surplus is maximized when the equilibrium admissions rate equals the monopoly
admissions rate, a¯ = θ. On the interval a¯ ∈ [0, θ), the producer surplus is increasing.
Consequently, when colleges coordinate on the the low admissions rate equilibrium, rather
than the high admissions rate equilirium, this results in a loss of producer surplus, which
we define ∆PSL,H ≡ PS(a¯L)− PS(a¯H):
∆PSL,H = Qd
î
2θ(aL − aH)− a2L + a2H
ó
= Qd [2θ(aL − aH)− (aL + aH)(aL − aH)]
= Qd [2θ(aL − aH)− θ(aL − aH)]
= θQd(aL − aH).
It is convenient to rewrite producer surplus in terms of the difference aH − aL, which is
positive:
∆PSL,H = −θQd(aH − aL). (2.17)
2.3.3. Comparison
The loss in producer surplus from the low equilibrium is exactly twice the loss in consumer
surplus. Colleges suffer greater absolute losses than students, but students suffer larger
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relative losses. In particular, the producer surplus is larger than twice the consumer surplus:
PS − 2CS = 2θQd − a¯2Qd︸ ︷︷ ︸
PS
−2
ï
1
2
(a¯2Qd)
ò
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CS
(2.18)
= 2a¯2Qd
Å
θ
a¯
− 1
ã
> 0. (2.19)
2.3.4. Social Surplus
In a given equilibrium, the admissions rate is a¯ ∈ {aL, aH}, the total social surplus is the
sum of the consumer surplus of equation (2.14) and the producer surplus of equation (2.16):
SS(a¯) =
1
2
a¯2Qd︸ ︷︷ ︸
CS
Å
4θ
a¯
− 1
ã
. (2.20)
Becausethe monopoly admissions rate θ is always greater than or equal to the equilibrium
admissions rate (for an interior solution), the social surplus is always greater than three
times the consumer surplus. The difference in the social surplus between the low equilibrium
and the high equilibrium ∆SSL,H ≡ SS(a¯L) − SS(a¯H) is equal to one and one half times
the difference in the producer surplus between the two equilibria:
∆SSL,H = −3
2
θQd(a¯H − a¯L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−∆PSL,H
.
The negative value of the difference in the social surplus reflects the reality that both colleges
and students are independently worse off under the low admissions rate equilibrium relative
to the high admissions rate equilibrium. The low admissions rate equilibrium is therefore
Pareto dominated by the high admissions rate equilibrium.
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2.4. Equilibrium Selection
The comparative statics of the model provide clear guidance on which equilibrium is played.
We will exploit this to show that elite schools play the low admissions equilibrium.
Proposition: If increases in demand for the N colleges result in a decrease in the admissions
rate then the colleges are coordinating on the low admissions rate a¯L = a¯−. If instead,
increases in the demand for colleges results in an increase in the admissions rate, then
colleges are coordinating on the high admissions rate a¯H = a¯+.
Proof. The demand function is Q(P ) = P0b − Pb . Increases in P0, the intercept of the inverse
demand function, shift the demand curve outward, while preserving the price sensitivity of
demand, b. The comparative statics for the high and low equilibrium is given by:
da¯±
dP0
=
1
2
Å
dθ
dP
ã Ä
1±√1− 4λ
ä
± (−θ)
Ä
− dλdP0
ä
√
1− 4λ . (2.21)
To simplify the comparative statics in equation (2.21), we rely on the following relationships:
dλ
dP0
= − 2br
(P − c)3 = −
2λ
P0 − c , (2.22)
dθ
dP0
=
1
2bQd
−
Å
P0 − c
2bQ2
ãÅ
dQd
dP0
ã
=
1
2bQd
(1− 2θ) . (2.23)
This simplifies the comparative statics in the following way:
da¯±
dP0
=
Ç
θ
2(P − c)
åÇ
(1− 2θ)
î
1±√1− 4λ
ó
± 4λ√
1− 4λ
å
. (2.24)
To complete the first part of the proof, we show that for positive monopoly admissions rates
(θ > 0), the comparative static on the low admissions equilibrium is always negative, i.e.
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da¯−
dP0
< 0. For θ > 0, we show that we have a contradiction if da¯−dP0 > 0:
da−
dP0
> 0
=⇒
Ç
(1− 2θ)
î
1−√1− 4λ
ó
− 4λ√
1− 4λ
å
> 0
=⇒
Ñ
(1− 2θ)− 4λî
1−√1− 4λ
ó√
1− 4λ
é
> 0
=⇒ −1
2
Ñ
1−√1− 4λî
1−√1− 4λ
ó√
1− 4λ
é
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
> θ
=⇒ −1
2
Ç
1√
1− 4λ
å
> θ
=⇒ 0 > θ.
The final part of the proof involves demonstrating that the comparative static for a¯H is
positive. First, we observe that for non-negative marginal cost such that 0 < c < P0, it is
always the case that the monopoly admissions rate is less than half, i.e. θ = 12− cP0 < 12 from
equation (2.5). It is evident from equation (2.24) that the comparative static is positive for
the high admissions equilibrium a¯+ if the monopoly admissions rate, θ, is less than
1
2 .
Remark: Since we observe increasing demand and falling admissions rates at elite colleges,
elite colleges must be playing the low admissions equilibrium aL = a¯−.
2.5. Parameter Estimation
From the sharp comparative statics, we have determined that elite schools play the low
equilibrium aL. In the data we observe the equilibrium admissions rate a¯, and from the
data we can estimate the elasticity of supply with respect to demand, s,d. The model gives
us an expression for the two unknown parameters: θ the monopoly admissions rate and λ
the prestige ratio, as functions of the two observed quantities – the admissions rate and
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the demand elasticity of supply. We solve for the parameter values using the method of
elimination given that we have two equations and two unknowns.
2.5.1. The Elasticity of Supply
Proposition: If the demand elasticity of the admissions rate, a equals -1, then the number
of spaces offered at a college does not change with increases in demand. If a < −1 then
the supply of slots decreases with increases in student demand, otherwise increased student
demand results in an increase supply of spaces.
Proof.
qs = a¯Qd (2.25)
=⇒ dqs
dP0
= Qd
da¯
dP0
+ a¯
dQd
dP0
(2.26)
=⇒ dqs
dP0
= bP0
da¯
dP0
+
a
b
(2.27)
=⇒ dqs
dP0
=
a
b
Å
P0
a
da¯
dP0
+ 1
ã
(2.28)
=⇒ dqs
dP0
=
a
b︸︷︷︸
>0
(a + 1) (2.29)
=⇒ b
a
dqs
dP0
=
Qd
qS
dqs
dQd
= a,P0 + 1 (2.30)
=⇒ s,d = 1 + d (2.31)
where s,d is the elasticity of supply with respect to demand. The sign of
dqs
dP0
depends on
the sign of (a + 1). In particular:
=⇒ dqs
dP0
=

< 0 if a < −1
= 0 if a = −1
> 0 if a > −1
(2.32)
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The demand elasticity is a function of the parameters, which we can derive from the model:
a¯±,P0 =
P0
a¯
da¯
dP0
(2.33)
=
1
2θ
− 1± λ√
1− 4λ (2.34)
The supply elasticity s,d, and the demand elasticity a¯±,P0 , are connected by an accounting
relationship, s,d = 1 + a¯±,P0 in equation (2.31).
s,d = 1 + a¯±,P0 (2.35)
=
1
2θ
± λ√
1− 4λ (2.36)
We will estimate the supply elasticity s,d directly from data by regressing the log of the
number of admitted students against the log of the number of applicants. We can then
rearrange equation (2.35) to solve for λ as a function of the monopoly admissions rate θ,
which is a free parameter, and the number of colleges N and the admissions rate a¯±, which
are both observed. After performing these steps, we arrive at the following expressions for
the prestige ratio:
λ =
−κ1 ±
»
κ21 + κ1
2
, (2.37)
where κ1 = θ
2(2θs,d − 1)2(a¯±)2.
2.5.2. Method of Elimination
To eliminate λ, so that we have an expression of just the monopoly admissions rate and the
data, we rewrite the expression for the equilibrium admissions rate to obtain λ as a function
of the unknown monopoly admissions rate and the observable variables, and we then equate
this expression to equation (2.37). This elimination step produces a relationship between a
single unknown parameter, the monopoly admissions rate (θ), and the data. The expression
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for λ, from rewriting the equilibrium admissions rate is:
λ =
Å
a¯±
θ
ãÅ
1− a¯±
θ
ã
(2.38)
The result of this final elimination step is that the monopoly admissions rate satisfies the
following relationship:ï
2
Å
1− a¯±
θ
ãò2
−
ï
(2θs,d − 1)
Å
2a¯±
θ
− 1
ãò2
= 0. (2.39)
2.5.3. Estimates
Monopoly Admissions Rate (θ)
In the case where the observed admissions rate corresponds to the admissions rate in the
high equilibrium a¯+ = a¯H , the estimated mean monopoly admissions rate obtained from
solving equation (2.39) is:
θˆH =
Ç
3 + 4a¯Hs,d
4s,d
å(
1−
√
1− 32a¯Hs,d
(3 + 4a¯Hs,d)2
)
. (2.40)
In the case where the observed admissions rate corresponds to the admissions rate in the
low equilibrium a¯− = a¯L, the estimated mean monopoly admissions rate obtained from
solving equation (2.39) is:
θˆL =
Ç
1 + 4a¯Ls,d
4s,d
å(
1−
√
1− 32a¯Ls,d
(1 + 4a¯Ls,d)2
)
. (2.41)
For the special case where the elasticity of supply is zero, the estimated value of the
monopoly admissions rate is θˆ = 43 a¯H , for the case in which the high admissions equi-
librium is played, and θˆ = 4a¯L, for the case in which the low admissions equilibrium is
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played.8
Prestige Ratio (λ)
The prestige ratio is a function of the observed admissions rate and the monopoly admis-
sions rate. To estimate the prestige ratio from the data, we insert the estimated value
of the monopoly admissions rate into equation (2.38). In the case of the high admission
equilibrium, the estimate prestige ratio is:
λˆH =
Ç
a¯H
θˆH
åÇ
1− a¯H
θˆH
å
, (2.42)
where θˆH , the monopoly admissions rate in the high equilibrium, is determined by equation
(2.40). Similarly, for the case where the observed admissions rate is due to colleges playing
the low admission equilibrium (aL), the estimated prestige ratio is given by:
λˆL =
Ç
a¯L
θˆL
åÇ
1− a¯L
θˆL
å
. (2.43)
2.5.4. Computing the Economic Surplus from the Data
If we are in the low admission rate equilibrium, a¯L, the consumer surplus CS(a¯L) can
now be calculated directly from substituting the observed admissions rate and the observed
number of students that applied to the college, Qd into equation equation (2.14). There
is no estimation error in computing this value. To calculate the counter-factual consumer
surplus under the high admissions rate equilibrium, CS(a¯H), however, we must estimate the
model and use the parameter estimates to construct aH , which we then insert into equation
(2.14). The computation for the producer surplus and the social surplus follows the same
procedure. We compute standard errors on the derived parameters using the delta method.
8These results were obtained by setting the elasticity of supply equal to zero in equation (2.39) and
solving for the corresponding monopoly admissions rate. We verified that this gave the same result as taking
the limit as the elasticity of supply approached zero of equation (2.40) and (2.41).
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2.6. Data
We have admissions data on all eight Ivy League Colleges from 2003-2015. This data was
collected on an annual basis by the Ivy Coach, a college admissions consulting company
that specializes in preparing students to apply to Ivy League colleges. For our purposes,
it is important that this data includes both the admissions rate as well as the number of
students applying for each college and the number of students granted admission to the
college. We merge this data with rankings data from the US News and Word Reports
covering the same 13 year period.
2.6.1. Summary Statistics
From 2003 to 2015, the average number of students applying to Ivy League colleges increased
by 90%, from 17,183 to 32,656 (Table 10). Over the same period that demand for admissions
to the Ivy League almost doubled, the average number of students admitted at an Ivy League
college increased by 2.4% from 2,773 to 2,840. With the increase in demand outstripping
the increase in supply, the average admissions rate has nearly halved, from 16.1% in 2003 to
8.7% in 2015. This trend in the data is consistent with Ivy league colleges playing the low
admissions equilibrium in which increasing demand results in decreasing average admissions
rates. It is worth noting that the marginal admissions rate is substantially lower than the
average admissions rate. Since 2003, there are 15,473 more applicants competing for 67 new
spaces, resulting in a marginal admissions rate of 0.4%.
2.7. Empirical Framework
For the purposes of estimating the model, we focus on the three of the eight Ivy League
schools: Harvard, Yale and Princeton (HYP). The goal of focusing on these three is that
they come close to satisfying the core assumptions of the model: (i) the N schools are
identical, (ii) they compete over prestige and (iii) students will apply so long as their
willingness to pay is greater than zero. We take each of these assumptions in turn, using
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the summary statistics in Table 11 and Table 12 to demonstrate that the HYP trio come
closer to satisfying the assumptions of the model than the non-HYP Ivy league colleges:
Columbia, Penn, Brown, Dartmouth and Cornell.
2.7.1. Assumptions
Assumption #1: Identical Colleges
In equilibrium, the N schools each coordinate on the same admissions rate and the average
admissions rate in the group equals the admissions rate adopted by each of the schools. Over
the sample period, 2003-2015, the mean admissions rate of the HYP schools is 8.2%, and
each member of the group has an average admissions rate that falls within one percentage
point of the group mean. In particular Harvard has an average admissions rate of 7.5%,
Yale 8.2% and Princeton 9.1% (Table 10). In contrast, the non-HYP Ivies have average
admissions rates that differ by as much as 6.4 percentage from the group mean. Cornell,
for example has an average admissions rate of 20.4% and Brown has an admissions rate of
11.6%, while the group mean is 14% (Table 11).
Assumption #2: Competition over Prestige
It is natural to take the model to data using the schools that are most at risk to be harmed
by expanding supply due to prestige considerations. Harvard, Yale and Princeton are
consistently ranked as the #1, #2 and #3 schools in the country by US New and World
Reports College Rankings. In Table 11, we note that the HYP have an average ranking
of 1.82. The average ranking is lower than two because Harvard and Princeton often tie
for the top spot in the rankings. With each of these three schools at the very top of the
rankings, slight movements in the rankings determine which among these three schools is
the overall #1 college in America.
In contrast, the stakes are relatively lower at the non-HYP Ivies (Table 12). Among the
non-HYP Ivies, where the average ranking is 10.4, movement in the rankings affects which
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schools break into the top 10, rather than determining the overall top spot. Columbia and
Penn typically oscillate somewhere around a ranking of #8. Cornell and Brown, on the
other hand are, on average ranked, #13, with Dartmouth consistently ranked at #11 on
the list of Best US Colleges.
Assumption #3: Minimum WTP = 0
We assume that the marginal student who applied to a college has a willingness to pay of
0. This assumption pin downs how many students apply to the college as a function of
the parameters of the inverse demand function; it relies on a school pursuing a policy of
need-blind admissions with both domestic and international students. If a school is need-
blind to domestic, but not international students, as is the case with all non-HYP, excluding
Dartmouth (as of 2008), the marginal international student is one whose willingness to pay
is a non-zero value that is bounded above by the full cost of tuition. The HYP colleges
have all practiced need-blind admissions for both domestic and international students since
2001; therefore, the HYP Ivies are the only colleges in the Ivy league where we can reliably
impose this assumption on the willingness-to-pay of the marginal student (Table 11).
2.7.2. Parameter Estimates
The two key parameters that we estimate from the model are the monopoly admissions
rate (θ) and the prestige ratio (λ). To estimate these two parameters, we use the observed
admissions rate, which we know is a¯L, from the comparative statics of the model and the
observation that increased demand has resulted in decreased admissions rates. We also use
the demand elasticity of supply, which we estimate from the data.
Estimating the Demand Elasticity of Supply
From Table 11 we observed that across the Ivy League demand increased by 90% but supply
increased by a mere 2.4%. This gives us a estimate of around 0.027 for the demand elasticity
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of supply. To obtain a more precise measure of this elasticity, we run a regression of the log
number of admitted students at each HYP Ivy, against the log of the number of applicants
in that year:
log(no. admitsi,t) = s,dlog(no. applicantsi,t) + Controlsi,t, (2.44)
In our preferred specification (Table 13), in which we include school fixed effects, a dummy
that equals 1 for Princeton and Harvard during the years in which they eliminated their
early action program (2007-2011), and a variable for lagged yield, we get an elasticity of
s,d = 0.074 (0.026). The approximated value of 0.027, which we read off from the raw
data, lies in the confidence interval of the estimated value of 0.074. Including the lagged-
yield is important because it allow us to control for a school strategically admitting more
students because last year’s yield was low. The coefficient on lagged yield is close to -1,
which suggests that schools are using the yield of the prior year to forecast the number of
acceptances that it should make in order to fill the class. Absent this control, the supply
elasticity estimates would be biased upwards.
Monopoly Admissions Rate & Prestige Ratio
Finding the monopoly admissions rate involves simply substituting the values of s,d = 0.074,
which we estimated, and a¯L, the average admissions rate, into equation (2.41). In the data,
we observe admissions rates for Harvard Yale and Princeton, and denote its average value
as a¯L. We use the same supply elasticity of demand in each year.
Once we have estimates for θ and λ, we can derive values for the marginal cost as a fraction
of the maximum willingness to pay ( cP0 ) and the prestige weight r. In particular r = 2λQθ
2,
in units of P0 and
c
P0
= 1− 2θ.
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2.8. Results
2.8.1. Parameter Estimates
In Table 14, we report the summary statistics for the estimated and derived parameters
over the 12 year period 2003-2015. In Figure 10, which appears in the appendix, we provide
graphs of the annual point estimates with standard errors computed using the delta method.
The average monopoly admissions rate ranges from a low of 26% to a high of 44% and the
marginal cost as a fraction of the maximum willingness to pay ranges from a low 0.11 to a
high of 0.49. Over time, the monopoly admissions rate is declining and the marginal cost
is increasing. One of the most striking results in this table is that the prestige ratio, λ is
highly stable across the 13 years in the data (Figure 10). It has a maximum of 0.186 and a
minimum of 0.0183, which suggests that in each year the ratio of the school’s prestige weight
to the total social surplus under perfect competition is a shade smaller than one fifth. The
prestige weight, r, as measured in units of the maximum willingness to pay ranges from 765
to 1,272.
2.8.2. Decomposition of Economic Surplus
We use these estimated values of the parameters to calculate the Consumer Surplus, Pro-
ducer Surplus and the Social Surplus in units of P0, the maximum willingness to pay. The
results of this exercise are recorded in Table 15.
These results confirm what we know from the model, which is that both producers and
consumers are worse off in the low equilibrium relative to the high equilibrium. In the low
equilibrium the consumer surplus is on average 81 units, and the producer surplus is on
average 1,169 units. In the high equilibrium, the average consumer surplus is 9.6 times
higher at 782 units, whereas the producer surplus is a little over two times larger at 2,571
units. In addition to delivering 2,104 additional units of social surplus, play in the high
equilibrium results in a less skewed sharing of the social surplus between consumers and
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producers. In the high equilibrium the sharing rule is 1 to 3.23 in favor of producers,
whereas under the low equilibrium the social surplus is shared in a ratio of 1 to 14.4, also
in favor of producers.
2.8.3. A Conservative Dollar Estimate of the Loss in Social Surplus
We place a lower bound on the loss in social surplus by using the tuition sticker price to as
a conservative estimate of the maximum willingness to pay. We know from the results in
Table 11, that the average tuition at HYP is $34,871; consequently, a loss of 2,104 units of
social surplus is equivalent to an annual loss of $73M for each of the three peer schools. Of
this total $49M in losses are borne by the schools and the balance of $24M is borne by the
students, some of whom lose because they are not admitted, and others because they pay
a higher price conditional on being admitted, since there are fewer students enrolled in the
college.
2.9. Conclusions
In the past 13 years, the demand for admissions at Ivy league colleges has increased by
two-fold while the supply of spaces at Ivy League schools has increased by less than 3%. In
this paper we show that this empirical fact is consistent with a model in which schools have
utility over relative prestige. The key economic insight of the model is that schools may not
increase supply if increasing supply could result in reduced utility due lower relative prestige.
There exists, however, a Pareto improving equilibrium of the model in which all schools
may expand supply in the face of increasing demand. Based on our estimates, there is the
potential for an increase in social surplus that is on the order of $73M per annum (for each
school). The existence of this Pareto-improving equilibrium suggest that there are welfare
gains to be had from allowing elite schools to collude on admissions strategies, particularly
if this collusion results in schools colluding to play the high admission equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 3 : Property Rights and Economic Growth: A Caribbean Natural
Experiment
Abstract: I take advantage of a natural experiment to study the effect of property rights
on economic growth. I estimate that per capita GDP in the Bahamas grew by an average of
22% (3% per year over 12 years) in response to a law that limited the ability of non-natives
to buy and sell land in the Bahamas. Using an instrumental variables approach, I show
that this growth occurred in spite of a downturn in net foreign direct investment due to the
passage of the law which weakened the property rights of non-native investors. The results
of this study highlight the economic importance of distinguishing between the protection of
private property for natives and non-natives as separate channels through which institutions
cause economic growth. (JEL E02,O11,O43,O54)
3.1. Introduction
I study a natural experiment in which the property rights of non-native investors is varied
in a plausibly exogenously way. The results of this study provide evidence that changes
in laws securing the property rights of non-natives may have a different effect on the eco-
nomic growth than changes in laws securing the property rights of non-natives. This point,
although not explicitly made in the literature, is related to the observation by Acemoglu et
al. (2002) that property rights protections that spur economic growth ought to protect a
“broad cross section of the society.”
The contributions of my work are two-fold. First, I dichotomize property rights into two
camps: (i) property rights protecting both native and non-native investors, and (ii) property
rights protecting native investors while leaving non-native investors exposed to the risk
of expropriation. To my knowledge, this native vs. non-native distinction has not been
explored in the property rights literature. Secondly, I measure the responsiveness of non-
natives to changes in property rights that differentially affect them.
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The native/non-native distinction that I make in this paper is economically meaningful
for two reasons. One, natives can use the political process (voting, uprisings and coups)
to discipline the government for encroaching on their property rights, whereas non-natives
generally do not possess this option. As a result, non-native investors may be more re-
sponsive to adverse changes in property rights than native investors because they lack this
political mechanism to deter government expropriation. Two, given the personal and fa-
milial connection that natives have to the host country, one can imagine that natives and
non-natives have different investment horizons, long term and short term respectively. To
the extent that both the investors and the government internalize the heterogeneity in
investment horizons between native and non-native investors, any strategic interaction be-
tween the investors and the government may be affected differentially by changes in the
property rights regime. When taken together, these two points suggest that we should care
about how changes in property rights affecting non-natives impact the macro economy –
non-natives investors being the group most sensitive to these changes on account of having
limited political recourse and a shorter time horizon.
The natural experiment that I study is a change in legislation that limited the ability of
non-natives to buy land in the Bahamas. In 1981, the government of the Bahamas enacted
the Immovable Property Act (IPA 81), which required non-natives to obtain government
approval in order to buy land in the Bahamas. In 1993, this law was repealed and replaced
with the International Persons Landholding Act (IPLHA 93), which allowed for non-natives
to buy land in the Bahamas without government approval. The IPLHA 93, moreover, placed
non-natives and natives on equal footing with respect to the assessment of stamp duties on
property purchases. Prior to the repeal of the IPA 81, non-natives paid twice the stamp
tax rate paid by natives. In the Bahamas stamp taxes range from 2% (on property valued
under $20,000) to 10% (on properties valued over $250,000).
For the purposes of this paper, I consider the passage of the IPA 81 to have three primary
effects. Firstly, by limiting the ability of non-natives to purchase property in the Bahamas,
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the IPA 81 effectively restricted the demand for Bahamian land. This demand restriction
and the resulting lower prices in the real estate market can be interpreted as an expropriation
of the value of the land by the government from actual investors. The second consequence of
the IPA 81 is its value as a signal to future investors of the risk of government expropriation
in the Bahamas. Third, the IPA 81 increased the cost of acquiring land in the Bahamas
in terms of the procedural costs in both time and money associated with obtaining the
government approval and paying higher stamp duties. The implementation of the IPLHA 93
in lieu of the IPA 81 has the opposite effect: (i) increasing demand for land in the Bahamas
and its market value, (ii) signaling a lower risk of government expropriation to potential
investors than before, and (iii) reducing the transaction cost in terms of both time and
money of acquiring property in the Bahamas.
Empirical identification depends on my using Barbados as a reference country and con-
structing a difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the IPA 81 on the economic
growth rate of the Bahamas. Further, I utilize the within country variation coming from
the repeal of the IPA 81 and the enactment of the IPLHA 93 to mitigate against omitted
variable bias and to instrument for changes in net Foreign Direct Investment. Regressing
the log of per capita GDP in the Bahamas on the dummy variable IPA 81, which represents
a weakening of property rights for foreign investors in the Bahamas, I obtain an ordinary
least squares estimate (OLS) of 0.15 and an instrumental variables (IV) estimate of 0.22,
both of which are significant at the one percent level. Weakening the property rights of
non-native investors results in a 15% growth in per capita GDP in the Bahamas. To put this
into perspective, annual growth in the Bahamas over the sample period is 5% (1976-2005).
This difference-in-difference estimate, is robust to a set of political, economic and natural
disaster controls.
3.2. Literature Review
An important theme in the Economic Development and Growth literatures is the role of
institutions in causing development – chief among institutions, the protection of private
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property. In an influential paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) show that
countries with strong property rights protection (historically settlement colonies) are, today,
better off economically than those with comparatively weaker property rights protections
(historically extractive colonies). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) posit that prop-
erty rights affect growth because “countries with better institutions, more secure property
rights, and less distortionary policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and
will use these more efficiently to achieve a greater level of income.” Similarly, La Porta et
al (2008) note that property rights help to attract foreign capital by signalling a lower risk
of government expropriation. In Banerjee and Iyer (2005), an alternate growth channel is
proposed. States with bad initial institutions grow at a slower rate because they must first
develop the good institutions necessary for growth, before getting on with the business of
economic development itself. The work by Dell (2010) provides additional evidence for this
framework of institutional overhang, which describes the persistence of colonial institutions
in explaining current economic development. Dell (2010) documents the persistent negative
effect of weak property rights on both economic and health outcomes in the case of Peruvian
miners. Field (2007) and Hornbeck (2010) provide two additional channels through which
property rights may affect economic development. In Field (2007), protection of private
property increases labor supply for the Peruvian rural poor as they substitute time spent
protecting their domicile for time spent working on jobs. In Hornbeck (2010), a techno-
logical innovation in the protection of private property - the introduction of barbed wire -
reduced losses to agricultural production by mitigating the risk of one farmer’s crops being
trampled by another farmer’s cattle.
The natural experiment in the literature most closely related to my work in this paper
is the two-country comparison in Henry and Miller (2010), where they compare Jamaica
and Barbados, both former British colonies with similar colonial history and post-colonial
institutions. In this paper, Henry and Miller (2010) show that the divergence in long-run
economic growth between Jamaica and Barbados can be explained by differences in the
macroeconomic policies adopted by the two countries in response to the oil crisis of the
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1970’s. In this paper, I use similar selection criteria to those used in Henry and Miller
(2010). In Figure 11, I observe that both the Bahamas and Barbados have similar colonial
origins and post-colonial legal institutions (British Common Law). Moreover, the countries
are similar in their population size, land mass (when comparing the main islands)1, and
economic structure. Both the Bahamas and Barbados are service-based economies with
modest levels of agricultural production and manufacturing. In the results section of the
paper, I will further motivate the validity of this cross country comparison by showing that
investor confidence in Barbados is unchanged during the time period that the Bahamas
experiences shocks to its property rights institutions due to IPA 81 and IPLHA 93.
The country comparison in this paper (Bahamas and Barbados) represents an advance over
the comparison in the Henry Miller paper (Jamaica and Barbados) in that the Bahamas and
Barbados match more tightly on the following criteria: population size, primary economic
activity and currency policy. Whereas Jamaica has a population size that is several times
larger than the population size of the Barbados (3 million and 300,000 respectively), the
Bahamas and Barbados have population sizes that differ by roughly 50,000 persons. In terms
of economic structure, Jamaica has an important mining industry due to its rich deposits
of aluminum ore. Barbados and the Bahamas both have a less developed mining sector
and derive most of their income from the service industries of tourism and offshore banking
(90% and 78% respectively). Finally Barbados and the Bahamas have both maintained a
currency peg with the US (2-1 and 1-1, respectively), for over 40 years. Jamaica on the
other hand has maintained a floating exchange rate for the past two decades.
The goal of outlining the details of the Bahamas and Barbados comparison is to demonstrate
that it meets the benchmarks established in the literature for natural experiments of this
kind and in some dimensions it builds on these standards. One limitation of the two-
1The comparison of the land mass in Barbados to the land mass of the main island in the Bahamas
is validated by the fact that close to 70% of the Bahamian population lives on the main island of New
Providence. The rest of the islands in the archipelago are sparsely populated. Equally, the total land mass
of the Bahamas comparable to total land mass of Jamaica, which was used as a comparison partner to
Barbados in Henry and Miller (2010).
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country comparison that I propose relative to the Henry and Miller (2010) comparison is the
time difference between when the Bahamas and Barbados became independent. Whereas
Jamaica and Barbados both gained independence in 1962, the Bahamas earned the right
to self-governance in 1967 followed by formal independence in 1973. The time series that
I have on net foreign direct investment only begins in 1975. Consequently, I am unable
to explicitly model this difference in my data analysis. Any effect of this distinction likely
shows up in the dummy variable for the Bahamas in my estimating regressions.
3.3. Addressing Endogeneity
The source of variation in property rights in this natural experiment is the passage of
the IPA 81 in the Bahamas and its subsequent repeal. As with any law, it is difficult to
assert that the passage of the law is exogenous relative to the outcome being measured. In
the spirit of Dell (2010), I provide some reasons for “plausible exogeneity” or endogeneity
that would bias against my finding a negative result of property rights for non-natives on
economic growth, which is the central result of my paper.
An important identifying assumption in my paper is that the Bahamas and Barbados are
similar countries and as such the passage of a law like the IPA 81 was equally likely in
both countries, but simply happened to occur in the Bahamas and not Barbados - a type
of historical accident which would make exogeneity of the IPA 81 and its subsequent repeal
plausible. Some suggestive historical evidence supporting this proposition is the following.
In 2008, the opposition Democratic Labor Party of Barbados articulated a land zoning
policy of a similar genre to the IPA 81 in the Bahamas:
The Democratic Labor Party believes that land ownership is too important to
the Barbadian identity to be left totally to market forces. The time has come for
Government to intervene to ensure that every Barbadian gets an opportunity to
own a piece of the Rock. This can best be achieved through effective zoning. The
East Coast should be zoned for private residence and ‘inland tourism’ controlled
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by locals; and most central parishes zoned for farming. Many areas should be
zoned for sale only to Barbadians. (Democratic Labor Party Manifesto, pg. 8)
The Democratic Labor Party of Barbados won the January 15, 2008 election unseating, the
ruling Barbados Labor Party, who had governed for the previous 14 years. The purpose
of this example is to illustrate that the same considerations that led the government in
the Bahamas to enact the IPA 81 are present in a viable political party in Barbados, the
control country in this natural experiment. While it remains to be seen whether the DLP in
Barbados implements a similar legislation to the IPA 81 in the Bahamas, the goal of offering
this historical context is to provide suggestive evidence that the natural experiment that
I study in this paper is well-suited to address potential endogeneity concerns by showing
that the treated and untreated countries are similar with one important difference being
the enactment and subsequent repeal of the IPA 81 in the Bahamas.
Another piece of historical evidence supporting the assertion that the IPA 81 can be thought
of as a type of historical accident comes from studying the context under which it was
implemented in the Bahamas. The governing party which enacted the Immovable Property
Act, the Progressive Liberal Party, won the government in 1967 by forming a coalition
government with two independent members of the House of Parliament following a 18-18 tie
with the United Bahamian Party in the General Election of 1967. Had the two independents
instead joined the the United Bahamian Party in forming the government, it is unlikely that
the IPA 81 would have been enacted given the differences in political philosophy between
the two parties. Moreover, given the closeness of the election, the political balance of power
could have plausibly tipped in either direction.
Thirdly, the IPA 81 was enacted to reduce land speculation in the Bahamas by non-natives.
Since the reason for enacting the IPA 81 was a prima facie political restriction on a type of
investment in Bahamian land, one would expect that any omitted variable bias would serve
to overstate the positive effect of property rights on economic development and on investor
confidence. Since I find a negative effect of property rights on per capita GDP, the omitted
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variable bias is not operational in my favor for the central result of this paper. 2
3.4. Data
My data set includes per capita GDP, net foreign direct investment figures, and the consumer
price indices (CPI) for both countries. The per capita GDP time series extends to 1960. The
net foreign direct investment data begins in 1976. The consumer price index data begins
from 1960. I also have data on aggregate property purchases in the Bahamas covering 33
years during the period 1972-2009. This data is broken down into land purchases by natives
and land purchases by non-natives for each year.
In addition to these financial data, I have a time series on population data, election out-
comes, and the dates of major hurricanes for both countries. I use the population data to
compute net foreign direct investment per capita for each country-year observation. This
normalized measure of net foreign direct investment helps me to control for changes in
population growth while providing a natural comparison variable between the measured
outcome (per capita GDP) and the proposed channel (foreign direct investment). I use the
election data to construct control dummies for changes in government and one year forward
lags for changes in government. These government controls in my study mitigate against
omitted variable bias due to changes in investor decisions driven by differences in prefer-
ences between the political parties with in a country, investor aversion to the uncertainty
accompanying electoral change, and the implementation of addition policies that may work
in concert with IPA 81 or IPLA 93 in driving investor confidence or economic growth. I use
the hurricane data to construct control a variable for unforeseen natural disasters. With
this natural disaster variable, I control for omitted variable bias due to country-specific
shocks.
2In “The Economics of Density: Evidence from the Berlin Wall (2001) Ahlfeldt et al. argue that the Berlin
Wall provides an exogenous source of variation in the types of businesses on either side of the wall, since the
wall boundaries were determined for military rather than economic reasons. One can similarly argue that
the political reasons for enacting the IPA 81 would mitigate against possible endogeneity concerns.
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3.5. Identification
My identification strategy depends on two methodologies, (i) an event study methodology,
and (ii) a difference-in-differences estimator . In the first stage of my analysis, I use these
two methodologies to estimate the effect of property rights (IPA 81) on net Foreign Direct
Investment (NFDI). Here I use the IPA as a proxy for property rights, i.e., when the IPA 81
is in effect property rights for non-natives are limited. The purpose of the first stage is to
establish that IPA 81 is a valid proxy for a change in property rights that affects investor
confidence. In the second stage of my analysis, I use the two empirical approaches to
estimate the direct effect of IPA 81 on per capita GDP and the indirect effect of IPA 81 on
per capita GDP through its effect on net foreign direct investment.
3.5.1. Event Study
It is standard in event studies to observe pre-treatment and post-treatment data. Discon-
tinuous breaks in the data very close to time of the experimental treatment then capture
the treatment effect, assuming exogeneity of the treatment. In this study, I track net for-
eign direct investment and per capita GDP in both the Bahamas (the treated country) and
Barbados (the control country), before and after the two treatments. I construct a 5 year
event-study window on both sides of the treatment dates (1981 and 1993). This approach
has three benefits: (i). I maximally use the data, since the 1976 data are included in the
first event study window; (ii). the event study windows for the two treatments are non-
overlapping: 1976-1986 and 1988-1998 and; (iii). the event study windows are large enough
to capture time-series variation but narrow enough to contain the immediate effect of the
two treatments.
3.5.2. Difference-in-Differences Estimate
The second estimation strategy that I employ is a difference-in-differences estimate, using
pooled data for both the Bahamas and Barbados across all years. For the first stage of this
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analysis, I regress net foreign direct investment per capita (NFDI) on the property rights
dummy IPA 81, a country dummy for the BAH, a continuous time variable (TIME) and
the political and climate controls (denoted X).
NFDIi = α0 + α1BAH + θ1IPA 81 + α2TIME + α3BAH ∗ TIME + γ1X + ui (3.1)
The property rights dummy IPA 81 equals one (1) for country-year data where the country
is the Bahamas and the year of observation coincides with the time period when IPA 81 is
operative (1982-1993). It is zero (0) otherwise. The country dummy equals (BAH) one (1)
for observations of the Bahamas and zero (0) for observations of Barbados.
The second stage results entail running a similar regression to the one in the first stage,
with log(per capita GDP) replacing NFDI as the outcome variable and NFDI entering the
right hand side as an explanatory variable. To test whether property rights influence growth
through its effect on attracting foreign investment, I interact the property rigths dummy
with the NFDI explanatory variable.
log(GDPi) =β0 + β1BAH + θ2IPA 81 + λ1NFDI + λ2IPA 81×NFDI+
β2TIME + β3BAH × TIME + β4log(CPI) + γ2X + vi
(3.2)
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3.5.3. Contemporaneous Difference Estimate
3.6. Results
3.6.1. Treatment # 1: Suspension of Property Rights for Non-Natives in the Bahamas
(IPA 81)
The first treatment that I study is the enactment of the Immovable Property Act in 1981
(IPA 81). I consider this treatment to be an adverse shock to the property rights of foreign
investors in the Bahamas. As illustrated in Figure 12, pre-treatment3 net foreign direct
investment (NFDI) is positive (on average) in both the Bahamas and Barbados. Further,
pre-treatment NFDI in the Bahamas is generally greater than pretreatment NFDI in Bar-
bados. After the first treatment, NFDI in Barbados remains positive and stable relative to
pre-treatment values. This fact is consistent with Barbados being a suitable control coun-
try for the IPA 81 policy variation in Bahamas. NFDI in the Bahamas, on the other hand,
falls following the passage of IPA 81. This decrease in NFDI in the Bahamas suggests that
investor confidence in the Bahamas may have declined in response to the change in property
rights in the Bahamas.
In Figure #3, I report the difference in per capita GDP between the Bahamas and Barbados
above the pre-treatment average, i.e. ∆ GDP = (per capita GDP Bahamas - average pre-
treatment per capita GDP Bahamas) - (per capita GDP Barbados - average pre-treatment
per capita GDP Barbados). As time approaches the event date, 1981, the GDP gap between
the two countries, (∆ GDP) is steady at around $600 per capita. After the event date, the
GDP gap jumps by $400, which is equivalent to 6% of the Bahamas’s per capita GDP in 1981
or equally 10.5% of Barbados’s per capita GDP in 1981. Thereafter, the GDP gap continues
an upward trajectory, increasing at a rate of $1,000 every two years. Based on Figure 13,
the average increase in the GDP gap (1981-1986) is $2,033 or 31% of the Bahamas’s GDP in
3Since the Immovable Property Act was passed by the Bahamian government in November of 1981, one
can consider the observed value of net FDI in 1981 to be minimally contaminated by the treatment of the
act being passed. For consistency purposes, in the second treatment, I also include the data from 1993 in
the pre-treatment data, since the Immovable Property Act is repealed on December 31st of that year.
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1981. The Bahamas therefore develops an income advantage over Barbados notwithstanding
the reduction in foreign direct investment accompanying the passage of the Immovable
Property Act, which weakens the property rights of non-natives in the Bahamas.
In the baseline specification, my OLS results yield a difference-in-differences estimate of 15%
for the effect of IPA 81 on per capita GDP in the Bahamas (Table 16). This estimate is
significant at the one percent level and robust to controls for changes in government, lagged
changes in government, lagged changes in net foreign-direct investment and hurricanes.
3.6.2. Treatment #2: Return of Property Rights for Non-Natives in the Bahamas (IPLHA 93)
The second treatment in this natural policy experiment is the repeal of the IPA 81 and
the enactment of the IPLHA 93 in its place. Leading up to the General Elections of 1992
in the Bahamas, the opposition party established as a legislative priority “to repeal the
intimidating Immovable Property Act and enact an Investment Act designed to promote and
enhance economic growth and employment”(FNM Manifesto). After the opposition party
won the government, the Immovable Property Act (IPA 81) was repealed on December 31,
1993 and replaced with the International Persons Landholding Act (IPLHA 93). Under
the International Persons Landholding, non-natives could purchase land in the Bahamas
without government approval.
This second treatment provides an additional event study where I observe the effect of
property rights legislation on economic development through the foreign investment channel.
Again using net foreign direct investment in Barbados as control, I get an across country
comparison for the effect of strong property rights institutions on investment. Secondly, the
legislative repeal enables me to do a within country comparison to the initial treatment.
In Figure 14 we observe that prior to the treatment, total net foreign direct investment in
the Bahamas and in Barbados is on average $71 per capita and $34 per capita, respectively.
In the five years following the treatment in 1993, net foreign direct investment in Barbados
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remains stable at an average of $44 per capita.4 Per capita net foreign direct investment in
the Bahamas, on the other hand, increases almost six-fold during the post treatment period,
averaging $401 per capita. Any concerns that this NFDI increase is due to the change in
government in the Bahamas is obviated by the fact that NFDI in the Bahamas is fairly
constant from 1992-1994. The government changes in 1992, the Immovable Property Act
(IPA 81) is repealed on Dec 31st, 1993, and the IPHLA 93 comes into effect on January
1st, 1994. The time delay between the government change and the repeal of the Immovable
Property Act is a nice feature of this natural experiment. I use this feature of the experiment
to un-bundle the effect of the change in government from the effect of the repeal of the
IPA 81 (enactment of IPHLA 93) on foreign direct investment in the Bahamas. Looking
at Figure 14, the steady increase in net foreign direct investment occurs from 1994 onwards.
This observation is consistent with a story in which net foreign direct investment in the
Bahamas grows because non-natives face less uncertainty.
In Figure 15, I report the difference in per capita GDP between the Bahamas and Barbados
above the pre-treatment average, i.e. ∆ GDP = (per capita GDP Bahamas - average
pre-treatment per capita GDP Bahamas) - (GDP per capita GDP Barbados – average pre-
treatment per capita GDP Barbados). As the time approaches the event date, 1993, the
GDP gap between the two countries is steady at around $500 per capita. After the event
date, the GDP gap narrows by $250 in 1994 and oscillates about zero over the next four years
in my event study window. The average change in the GDP gap between the two countries
is $4.20, or 0.03% of the Bahamas’ GDP in 1993. Here we find that property rights do in
fact positively affect net foreign direct investment. Net foreign direct investment, however,
has very low pass through to economic growth, i.e. a net increase in per capita net foreign
direct investment of $330 is associated with an average increase of $4.20 in per capita GDP.
The results of this second treatment, motivate the use of the IPLHA 93 as an instrument
for net foreign direct investment in the GDP regression. The IPLHA 93 has a significant
4This fact that net-FDI in Barbados varies continuously across the discontinuity at 1993 is again reas-
suring because Barbados is the comparison country which does not receive the treatment.
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effect on net foreign direct investment in the Bahamas, the treated country, and no effect on
Barbados the control country (Table 17). Additionally, the IPHLA 93 has an insignificant
direct effect on per capita GDP, i.e. it affects per capita GDP through its effect on net
foreign direct investment. In the OLS regression of log per capita GDP where I include
the effects of IPLHA 93 and a time trend of IPLHA 93, the point estimates on these two
control variables are insignificant, t-values of -0.35 and 1.5 respectively. Moreover, due to
the timing of the IPLHA 93, and the fact that it replaces another law, it is unbundled to
some degree from the existing political and legislative background of other laws and policies,
which may have worked in concert with the IPA 81 in influencing foreign investment in the
Bahamas.
In the first stage of my two stage least squares instrumental variables estimate, I regress
net foreign direct investment on the instruments IPLHA 93 and a time trend of IPLHA 93
(TIME IPLHA 93) as well as on the controls that appear in the baseline model for my
regression on log(per capita GDP).
NFDI =α0 + α1BAH + θ1IPA 81 + α2TIME + α3BAH ∗ TIME+
α4IPLHA 93 + α5TIME IPLHA 93 + log(CPI) + 
(3.3)
Using the coefficients from the first stage, I construct an estimated NFDI, which I denote
NFDI 2SLS. In the second stage, I use this constructed value NFDI 2SLS in the place of
NFDI in the regression of log(per capita GDP). The second stage regression that I then run
is:
log(GDP ) =β0 + β1BAH + θ2IPA 81 + λ1NFDI 2SLS + λ2IPA 81×NFDI 2SLS+
β2TIME + β3BAH × TIME + β4log(CPI) + γ2X + v
(3.4)
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Using this instrumental variables approach, I obtain an estimate of 22% for the effect of
IPA 81 on per capita GDP in the Bahamas (Table 17). This result is significant at the one
percent level and is robust to electoral, hurricane and lagged NFDI controls that are used
to check the OLS result.
3.7. Robustness Checks
Internal Validity
In this section, I perform three robustness checks on my data. First I check that the results
that I obtained are driven by the changes in the law rather than the choice of Barbados
as a control country. I do this by running the OLS regression just using the data from the
Bahamas, depending on the enactment of IPA 81 and it subsequent repeal as the source
of variation for property rights. Under this specification, I obtain an effect size of 17%
for IPA 81 (Table 18). This estimate is significant at the one percent level and lies in the
confidence interval for the OLS estimate that I previously found using the pooled difference-
in-differences estimator. The coefficient on the other variables in the un-pooled regression
likewise lie in the confidence intervals of the point estimates from the pooled regression in
which I use data from both the Bahamas and Barbados.
Counter-factual & Placebo Tests
Second, I do a counter-factual analysis that consist of the following two hypotheticals: (i)
IPA 81 is not enacted in the Bahamas (ii) IPA 81 is enacted in Barbados. Under the
first counter-factual experiment, I obtain a negative insignificant point estimate for net
foreign direct investment (Table 18). This result is opposite to the positive (and also
insignificant) coefficient that I obtained from factual analysis. Under the second counter
factual experiment, I find an insignificant effect of the fictious IPA 81 on economic growth
in Barbados. The point estimate in the second experiment is 0.9% and the t-value is
0.21. Both counter-factual exercises cohere with the results in the previous section. First,
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omitting IPA 81 from the growth equation for the Bahamas leads to a spurious negative
correlation between net foreign direct investment and GDP growth. Secondly, including
fictitious piece of legislation in Barbados parallel IPA 81 in the Bahamas does not help to
explain economic growth in Barbados – the comparison country (Table 18).
3.7.1. Contemporaneous Difference Estimator
The third robustness check that I perform uses a contemporaneous difference estimator to
correct for unobserved shocks that are common to both the treatment and control country.
The contemporaneous difference estimator is obtained by differencing the dependent and
independent variables for the Bahamas (BAH) and Barbados (BDOS) for each time obser-
vation and then regressing the differenced depend variable on the differenced explanatory
variables. This contemporaneous difference estimator mitigates against omitted variable
bias driven by time-specific shocks that affect both the Bahamas and Barbados similarly,
e.g. the terrorist attacks of 9/11 which affected tourist travel to both islands. The estimat-
ing equation looks like:
log(GDPBAH,t)− log(GDPBDOS,t) = θˆ2IPA 81 + γˆ2X¯t + v¯t (3.5)
where X¯t and v¯t are the differenced control variables and error terms at time t. The
coefficient θˆ2 captures the effect of IPA 81 on the difference in growth rates between the
Bahamas and Barbados. By comparison, θ1 from the difference-in-differences estimator is
the average effect of IPA 81 on GDP growth rates in the Bahamas. In order to convert
from θˆ2 to θ1, I compound the growth difference θˆ2 over the N=12 years that IPA 81 is in
effect and compute it’s average. Mechanically, after j years of IPA 81, the growth in the
Bahamas due to IPA 81 is given by (1 + r)j , where r = θˆ2, the differential growth due to
IPA 81. I let ˆIPA 81 denote the average effect of IPA 81 computed using r = θˆ2.
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ˆIPA 81 =
1
N
[(1 + r) + (1 + r)2 + ...+ (1 + r)N ]− 1 (3.6)
The sum in the average growth equation is a standard geometric series, which simplifies to
ˆIPA 81 =
1
N
Å
1 + r
r
ã î
(1 + r)N − 1
ó
− 1 (3.7)
Estimating the contemporaneous difference model using the explanatory variables that are
significant across all specifications from the difference-in-differences estimation procedure,
I obtain a point estimate of θˆ1 = 0.03 and a standard error of 0.01 (Table 20). Computing
the average growth from the expression above, I obtain that the average growth is 0.219
or 21.9%, with a standard deviation of 0.086 or 8.6% (calculated using the delta method).
For comparison, I found the average effect of IPA 81 to 15% based on the OLS result and
22% based on the IV result. The results of the contemporaneous difference estimator is
significant at the one percent level and falls within the confidence interval of both the OLS
and IV estimators.
Correcting for Auto-correlation
In an important paper Bertrand, Duflo and Mullianathan (2004) demonstrate that auto-
correlation may lead to standard errors for difference-in-differences estimators which are
downward biased. As an additional check for auto-correlation, I regress the residuals from
the contemporaneous difference estimator on their lagged values out to five lags (Table 19).
The positive auto-correlation at one lag is sensitive to the addition of other lags (alternating
t-values of 0.84 and -0.90 in a model with four and five lagged residuals, respectively). There
is a robust negative correlation at three lags (t-values -2.83 and -3.24 in a model with four
and five lagged residuals, respectively). As a result of this robust negative auto-correlation,
the standard errors that I obtained from the contemporaneous difference estimator may be
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upward biased (too big) as opposed to being downward biased (too small).
To test whether this bias affects the inference that I make, I consider the following counter-
factual: I take the positive auto-correlation at one lag to be robust and significant and
the negative auto-correlation at four lags to be insignificant. This counter-factual provides
a worse-case scenario for the auto-correlation in my model, i.e. the situation in which
the standard errors are largest after I would have corrected for auto-correlation. To rid
the model of auto-correlation under this set of assumptions, I perform a Cochrane-Orcutt
transformation of the data and estimate the parameters of the model (Cochrane and Orcutt,
1949). The Cochrane-Orcutt transformation works when the residuals of the fit are serially
correlated at one lag, i.e. vt = ρvt−1 + ηt, where the ηt is exogenous and vt and vt−1 are
the residuals from the fit at time t and t-1. Given an estimating equation yt = Xtβ + ut,
the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation is y˜t = yt − ρyt−1 = (Xt − ρXt−1)β + ηt. By taking a
weighted first difference of the observations, this procedure eliminates the serial correlation
ρvt−1 from the error term for the observation at time t. The parameter ρ is estimated from
regressing the residuals on their first lagged values (estimated to be 0.43 in Table 19).
The results from this counter-factual experiment give θˆ2 = 0.028 and a standard error 0.014.
This point estimate has a p-value of 0.054 (Table 20). Using this value of θˆ2 in equation
(3.7), I find that the average effect of IPA 81 is 20.2% and the standard error is 0.11.5 My
preferred estimate of the average effect of IPA 81 is 22%, the common result from the con-
temporaneous difference estimator and the instrumental variables estimator. The standard
error on this point estimate is 5.9% for the contemporaneous difference estimator and 8.6%
for the IV estimator, making it significant at the five percent level in both specifications.
Recall that the negative auto-correlation result in larger standard errors, which makes it
likely that the true standard errors are closer to the standard errors obtained from the
5Checking, the residuals of the transformed model, I find that the serial correlation at one lag is eliminated,
as expected. Extending the model to more lags, I find that the negative auto-correlation at lag four remains
significant at the one percent level and there is an additional negative auto-correlation at lag three that is
also significant at the one percent level. The results of this counter-factual exercise suggest that main source
of auto-correlation is the negative auto-correlation at lag four. As such, the contemporaneous difference
estimator provides a more reliable auto-correlation robustness check.
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instrumental variables procedure.
3.8. Conclusion
In this natural experiment, I find that restricting foreign investment through weakened
property rights for non-natives resulted in economic growth in the Bahamas. Furthermore,
restoring property rights for non-natives did not have a significant effect on GDP growth - its
appreciable impact on foreign investment in the Bahamas notwithstanding. One limitation
of the work in this paper is that in this paper, I take an in-depth look at two countries
as opposed to looking at a cross-section of countries, at a given time. This affects the
generalizability of the empirical results to other contexts where the history, politics and
geography may be different from those of the Bahamas and Barbados. With this important
caveat in mind, these results suggest that it may be important to distinguish between
protection of private property for natives and non-natives when considering the mechanism
through which property rights institutions promote economic growth.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Chapter 1: Appendix
A.1.1. Figures and Tables
Table 1: Relative Marginal Utility of Minority Neighbors (Diff-in-Diff)
stats 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean -8.84 -7.29 -6.82 -6.41 -6.11
(0.79) (0.57) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
p50 -8.75 -7.10 -6.72 -6.48 -6.06
(0.18) (0.10) (0.29) (0.10) (0.10)
N 124 124 124 124 124
Table 2: Census Tract Tipping Points (Diff-in-Diff)
All 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.29 0.34
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
p50 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.29
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N 38,489 38,489 38,489 38,489 38,489
In Range (Current Year)† 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.41
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
p50 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.35
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
N 22,391 26,399 29,039 31,504 32,447
In Range (Census 2010)† 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.35 0.41
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
p50 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.27 0.35
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N 32,447 32,447 32,447 32,447 32,447
† A tract is in range if its tipping point ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 1: Kernel density plot of estimated census tract tipping points of Jersey City, NJ
and Mobile, AL in 1970.
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Figure 2: Kernel density plot of the racial preference parameter for each MSA from 1970
to 2010, using the diff-in-diff estimates.
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Table 3: Census Tract Tipping Point (Semi-Parametric)
All 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010*
mean 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.36 0.42
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
p50 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.34
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N 38,489 38,489 38,489 38,489 38,466
In Range (Current Year) 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.36 0.41
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
p50 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.34
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 38,333 38,085 37,941 37,803 37,694
In Range (Census 2010) 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.41
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
p50 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.34
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 37,694 37,694 37,694 37,694 37,694
∗ I dropped 23 extreme outliers in 2010.
Table 4: Correlation Tract Tipping Points (Semi-Parametric)
Year 2010 2000 1990 1980 1970
2010 1.00
2000 0.71 1.00
1990 0.58 0.78 1.00
1980 0.39 0.53 0.73 1.00
1970 0.18 0.25 0.40 0.77 1.00
# Observations 38,466 38,466 38,466 38,466 38,466
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Figure 3: Distribution of census tract tipping points for each census year using the tipping
points from the semi-parametric (inverse) method.
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Figure 4: Distribution of mean MSA tipping points for each census year using the tipping
points from the semi-parametric (inverse) method.
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Table 5: Average MSA Tipping Points
All 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.35
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
p25 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.22
p50 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.32
p75 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.39 0.46
N 123 123 123 123 123
Northeast 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.28
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.028)
p25 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.18
p50 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.24
p75 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.36
N 23 23 23 23 23
Midwest 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.24
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
p25 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.19
p50 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.22
p75 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.26
N 27 27 27 27 27
South 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.34 0.41
(0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
p25 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.29
p50 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.37
p75 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.40 0.49
N 45 45 45 45 45
West 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.36 0.43
(0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
p25 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.32
p50 0.12 0.19 0.28 0.38 0.46
p75 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.45 0.52
N 28 28 28 28 28
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Table 6: Median MSA Tipping Points
All 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.33
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
p25 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.22
p50 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.31
p75 0.16 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.43
N 123 123 123 123 123
Northeast 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.26
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
p25 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.18
p50 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.23
p75 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.31
N 23 23 23 23 23
Midwest 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.22
(0.009) (0.009) (0.09) (0.010) (0.010)
p25 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.18
p50 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.22
p75 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.24
N 27 27 27 27 27
South 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.38
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
p25 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.30
p50 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.35
p75 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.37 0.43
N 45 45 45 45 45
West 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean 0.11 0.19 0.25 0.36 0.42
(0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
p25 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.24 0.31
p50 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.38 0.43
p75 0.17 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.53
N 28 28 28 28 28
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Table 7: Correlation in Mean MSA Tipping Points
Year 2010 2000 1990 1980 1970
2010 1.00
2000 0.88 1.00
1990 0.85 0.97 1.00
1980 0.81 0.93 0.98 1.00
1970 0.65 0.79 0.84 0.88 1.00
# MSA 123 123 123 123 123
Table 8: Comparison of CMR and Blair Tipping Points
1990 1980 1970
% Marginal Tracts in MSA (below TP) 0.212 0.193 -0.015
(0.069)** (0.067)** (0.055)
% Marginal Tracts in MSA (above TP) 0.311 0.121 0.603
(0.169) (0.157) (0.123)**
Constant (Avg. Diff in CMR & Blair MSA TP) -0.153 -0.102 -0.077
(0.021)** (0.020)** (0.017)**
R2 0.17 0.12 0.26
N 101 100 93
Table 9: Effect of Preferences and Options on Tipping Points
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Minority HHI -0.011 -0.034 -0.070 -0.097 -0.144
(0.005)* (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.012)** (0.015)**
Non-minority HHI 0.006 0.026 0.055 0.066 0.112
(0.005) (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.012)** (0.015)**
Race Prefs. 0.066 0.076 0.058 0.032 -0.005
(0.007)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.008)
Constant 0.128 0.169 0.218 0.293 0.300
(0.012)** (0.016)** (0.018)** (0.020)** (0.020)**
Region Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.55 0.58
N 116 116 118 118 119
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Figure 5: Kernel density plot of the difference between the CMR tipping points and mean
MSA tipping points using all tracts, and using the marginal census tracts that are within 5
percentage points of their tipping point.
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Figure 6: Kernel density plot of the difference between the CMR tipping points and median
MSA tipping points using all tracts, and using just the marginal census tracts that are
within 5 percentage points of their tipping point.
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Figure 7: A plot of coefficient estimates from a regression of MSA tipping points on stan-
dardized measures of racial preferences and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) of the
minority and non-minority concentration of the MSA in census years C1970-C2010.
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A.1.2. Computing Tipping Point Standard Errors
Tract Tipping Points
The tipping point of census tract t, in MSA m as a function of the mean utility at the
tipping point xt computed from a 5-th order polynomial:
Tt,m = α0,m + α1,mxt + α2,mx
2
t + α3,mx
3
t + α4,mx
4
t + α5,mx
5
t (A.1)
I summarize the tipping points of the N census tracts in the MSA into a single N × 1 vector,
~Tm, using the following matrix equation:
~Tm = M ~αm. (A.2)
In this equation, ~α = (α0,m, α1,m, α2,m, α3,m, α4,m, α5,m)
′ is a colum vector of the cofficients
on the polynomial used to convert a mean utilty into a percent minority at the tipping
point, and M is a matrix of powers of the mean utility:
M =

1 x1,m x
2
1,m x
3
1,m x
4
1,m x
5
1,m
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
1 xn,m x
2
n,m x
3
n,m x
4
n,m x
5
n,m

. (A.3)
MSA Tipping Points
The MSA tipping point,T¯m which is an average of the tract tipping point, is given by:
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T¯m =
1
N
(~eN )
′ · ~Tm, (A.4)
where ~Tm is the vector of tract tipping point in the MSA and ~en is a column vector of N
ones used to take the average.
Applying the Delta Method
To compute the covariance matrix of the MSA tipping points, I employ the delta method.
The delta method uses a linear approximation of the tipping points in the vicinity of the
true parameters to the standard errors of the tipping points as a function of the covariance
matrix of the estimated parameters.
Let ~α∗ be the true parameter value and ~α be the estimated value of the parameter. Moreover,
suppose that
√
n(~α−~α∗)→ N(0,Σ). This implies that cov(~α) = ΣN . Starting with equation
(A.2), I approximate the tract tipping points in the vicinity of the true parameters to first
order:
~Tm(~α) ≈ ~Tm(~α∗) +
(
d~T
d~α
) ∣∣∣∣∣
~α=~α∗
(~α− ~α∗) (A.5)
=⇒ cov(~Tm(~α)) ≈
[(
d~T
d~α
) ∣∣∣∣∣
~α=~α∗
]
cov(~α)
[(
d~T
d~α
) ∣∣∣∣∣
~α=~α∗
]′
(A.6)
=⇒ cov(~Tm(~α)) ≈Mcov(~α)M ′ (A.7)
=⇒ cov(~Tm(~α)) ≈ MΣM
′
N
(A.8)
The standard errors for the tract tipping points are the diagonal entries of this matrix. For
example the standard error on the tipping point of tract t is given by:
se(Ttm(~α)) ≈
√
(~it)′MΣM ′(~it)
N
(A.9)
where ~it is an N×1 column vector of zeros in all rows except for the t-th row, which has an
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entry of 1.
Standard Error for MSA Tipping Points
The exercise for computing the standard errors for the MSA average tipping point relies on
similar implementation of the delta method. Applying the delta method to equation (A.4)
I obtain the following result:
T¯m(~α) ≈ T¯m(~α∗) +
Ç
dT¯
d~α
å ∣∣∣∣∣
~α=~α∗
(~α− ~α∗) (A.10)
=⇒ var(T¯m(~α)) =
[Ç
dT¯
d~α
å ∣∣∣∣∣
~α=~α∗
]
cov(~α)
[Ç
dT¯
d~α
å ∣∣∣∣∣
~α=~α∗
]′
(A.11)
=⇒ var(T¯m(~α)) = 1
N2
[(~eN )
′M ]cov(~α)[(~e′N )M ]
′ (A.12)
=⇒ var(T¯m(~α)) = 1
N3
[(~eN )
′M ]Σ[(~eN )′M ]′ (A.13)
=⇒ se(T¯m(~α)) =
 
[(~eN )′M ]Σ[(~eN )′M ]′
N3
(A.14)
Standard Error for Average MSA Tipping Point
To compute the average MSA tipping point in a given year, I perform a pooled regress of
the minority share of all tracts in all years on coefficients, which are allowed to vary by
both MSA and by year. In practice, the MSA tipping points computed above for a given
year form the building blocks of this estimation procedure.
A.1.3. Model of Housing Supply
Housing in each neighborhood n is supplied by a single, profit-maximizing firm. The firm
sets a price pn to maximize profits pin generated from new housing construction:
pin = (pn −MCn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price Mark-up
× (Qn −Qe,n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qty. New Housing
. (A.15)
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The quantity of housing demanded, Qn = Q
w
n + Q
m
n , is endogenous to the firm’s choice of
housing price, pn, as given by the demand functions for both whites (Q
w
n ) and minorities
(Qmn ) in equation (1.10). The quantity Qe,n is the existing housing stock in neighborhood
n from the previous period. This quantity is pre-determined. The difference Qn−Qe,n rep-
resents the new construction in the neighborhood that is supplied by the local monopolist.
The marginal cost of producing housing, MCn, is assumed to be a function of the density
of households, QnAn , where Qn is the total number of households in neighborhood n and An
is the total area of land in neighborhood n. The marginal cost of new construction also
depends on the elasticity of supply in the neighborhood, ηn, and on the cost of construction,
C0, which is assumed to be constant across the city:
MCn = C0
Å
Qn
An
ã 1
ηn
. (A.16)
Given the functional form in equation (A.16), the marginal cost of new construction is higher
in denser, more built-up neighborhoods, and likewise higher in cities where construction
costs are higher. In the case of a perfectly elastic housing supply, ηn →∞, and marginal cost
equals the cost of construction (i.e., MCn = C0). In the case of perfectly inelastic housing
supply, ηn → 0, and the marginal cost of constructing new housing becomes arbitrarily
large since developable land is unavailable. From this limiting behavior, it is evident that
the function form in equation (A.16) is consistent with our intuition on the reduced-form
relationships between marginal cost and the relevant inputs (construction cost, housing
density, and housing supply elasticity).
A.1.4. Solving the Firm’s Problem
Firm FOC
To solve the firm’s problem, I insert the marginal cost function from equation (A.16) into
the profit function of equation (A.15) and take the derivative of profits with respect to price,
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pn. This yields the following first-order condition:Å
Qn −Qe,n
Qn
ã
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Frac. New Supply: ∆Qn
+
Pn
Qn
Å
dQn
dpn
ã
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demand Elasticity: n,d
ï
1− MCn
Pn
Å
1 +
1
ηn
Å
Qn −Qn,e
Qn
ããò
︸ ︷︷ ︸
% Price Mark-up
= 0. (A.17)
The price elasticity of housing demand, d,n, in equation (A.17), is computed using the
demand function in equation (1.10):
d,n = − βwQ
w
n (Q
w
tot −Qwn )
QnQwtot︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution from Whites
− βmQ
m
n (Q
m
tot −Qmn )
QnQmtot︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution from Minorities
, (A.18)
=⇒ d,n = −βw(1− fn)sw−n − βmfnsm−n. (A.19)
The term sw−n =
(Qwtot−Qwn )
Qwtot
is the share of whites who live in neighborhoods other than n,
and sm−n =
(Qmtot−Qmn )
Qmtot
is the share of minorities who live in neighborhoods other than n. The
share of whites (minorities) in other tracts reflects the desirability of those tracts for whites
(minorities) relative to the inside option of neighborhood n. As such, the magnitude of the
elasticity of demand is increasing in the share of whites (minorities) in the outside option.
As previously introduced, fn is the fraction of minorities in neighborhood n, and βw and
βm are the price coefficients for whites and minorities in the utility function. For the case
where the share of minorities is close to zero, the elasticity of demand is approximately
equal to −βw, which is the price elasticity of demand for whites (sw−n ≈ 1 for large N). The
same is the case in the limit as fn → 1, where the price elasticity of demand simplifies to
−βm (sm−n ≈ 1 for large N).
Equilibrium Prices and Mark-ups
Solving this first-order condition of equation (A.17) for housing price as a function of the
elasticity of housing demand, −|d,n|, the elasticity of supply, ηn, marginal cost, MCn, and
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the fraction of the housing supply that is new construction, ∆Qn =
Qn−Qe,n
Qn
, I get that:
pn = MCn
Ñ
1 + ∆Qnηn
1− ∆Qn|d,n|
é
. (A.20)
The term ∆Qnηn is the component of the price mark-ups due to supply constraints, and the
term ∆Qn|d,n| captures the component of the price mark-ups due to demand pressure. This
decomposition is particularly salient when the fraction of new construction is much less
than the magnitude of the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply, ∆Qn|d,n|  1 and
∆Qn
ηn
 1. In this limit, the denominator in the price equation (A.20) is approximated in
the following way:
1(
1− ∆Qn|d,n|
) ≈ Ç1 + ∆Qn|d,n|å . (A.21)
Accordingly, the expression for equilibrium price, pn, in equation (A.20) is approximated
by:
pn ≈MCn
Ç
1 +
∆Qn
ηn
+
∆Qn
|d,n|
å
. (A.22)
A lower elasticity of supply, ηn, leads to higher prices. The more scarce developable land
is, the higher prices are in equilibrium. A lower elasticity of demand, the higher prices are
in equilibrium. If households are unresponsive to price increases, then demand pressure
bids up prices. Equilibrium prices are also proportional to marginal cost. Higher marginal
cost leads to higher prices. Rearranging equation (A.22) to solve for the price mark-up as
a fraction of the marginal cost, I find that the mark-up as a percentage of the marginal
cost equals the sum of the percentage increase in price due to the demand pressure and the
percentage increase in price due to the supply constraints:
Mark-up % =
pn −MCn
MCn
≈ ∆Qn
ηn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply Constraints
+
∆Qn
|d,n|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demand Pressure
. (A.23)
A lower elasticity of supply, ηn, leads to higher price mark-ups. Similarly, a lower elasticity
of demand (in magnitude), leads to higher price mark-ups. According to the model, housing
90
prices, as well as both absolute and relative price mark-ups, should be greater in large, dense
cities like New York and San Francisco than in cities like Phoenix or Dallas, which are less
dense and more supply and demand inelastic. Moreover, within cities, price and mark-up
differentials are higher in neighborhoods near the city center and coast, where available land
is scarce and demand is great and more price inelastic.
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A.2. Chapter 2: Appendix
A.2.1. Tables & Figures
Table 10: Ivy League Admissions Numbers (2003-2015)
Year No. Applied No. Admitted No. Entering
2003 17,183 2,773 1,669
2004 17,059 2,775 1,694
2005 18,717 2,865 1,685
2006 20,260 2,902 1,690
2007 21,100 2,813 1,703
2008 23,404 2,939 1,702
2009 25,293 3,004 1,723
2010 28,071 3,009 1,685
2011 30,717 3,019 1,726
2012 30,328 2,922 1,737
2013 30,910 2,876 1,741
2014 31,682 2,824 1,750
2015 32,656 2,840 .
Average 25,183 2,889 1,709
Table 11: Characteristics of HYP Ivies: Harvard, Yale, & Princeton (2003-2015)
College Rank Admit Rate Early Decision Need-blind Tuition ($)
Harvard 1.38 .075 0 1 34,298
Princeton 1.15 .091 0 1 34,388
Yale 2.92 .082 0 1 35,928
Average 1.82 .082 0 1 34,871
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Table 12: Characteristics of non-HYP Ivies (2003-2015)
College Rank Admit Rate Early Decision Need-blind Tuition ($)
Brown 12.8 .116 1 0 37,199
Columbia 7.77 .094 1 0 38,384
Cornell 12.9 .204 1 0 36736
Dartmouth 10.9 .132 1 .54 36,929
Penn 7.54 .154 1 0 35,099
Average 10.4 .140 1 .108 36,869
Table 13: Estimating the Demand Elasticity of Supply at HYP Ivies
Base FX No EA Lagged Yield
Log No. Applicants 0.180 0.158 0.144 0.074
(0.045)** (0.053)** (0.046)** (0.026)**
No Early Action (H & P) 0.055 0.044
(0.024)* (0.017)*
Lagged Yield -0.977
(0.153)**
Constant 5.769 5.988 6.117 7.530
(0.462)** (0.533)** (0.470)** (0.317)**
R2 0.37 0.40 0.49 0.75
N 39 39 39 36
Table 14: Estimated Parameters of the Model (2003-2015)
mean sd max min
Monopoly Admissions Rate (θ) 0.335 0.067 0.443 0.256
Prestige Ratio (λ) 0.184 4e-07 0.185 0.183
Scaled Marginal Cost
Ä
c
P0
ä
0.33 0.134 0.49 0.11
Prestige Weight
Ä
r
P0
ä
1007 173.7 765.0 1272
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Table 15: Welfare Results for HYP Ivies (2003-2015)
Equilibrium Admissions Rate mean sd max min
aL 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.06
aH 0.25 0.05 0.34 0.19
Consumer Surplus mean sd max min
CS(aL) 81.03 13.41 101.35 62.13
CS(aH) 782.33 140.42 999.05 588.72
∆CSL,H -701.31 127.01 -526.59 -897.70
Producer Surplus mean sd max min
PS(aL) 1,169.12 200.53 1,475.52 889.26
PS(aH) 2,571.73 454.54 3,270.91 1,942.44
∆PSL,H -1,402.61 254.02 -1,053.18 -1,795.39
Social Surplus mean sd max min
SS(aL) 1,250.14 213.94 1,576.87 951.39
SS(aH) 3,354.06 594.95 4,269.95 2,531.16
∆SSL,H -2,103.92 381.03 -1,579.77 -2,693.09
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A.2.2. Heterogeneity: Two Types of Colleges
We considered the case of N identical colleges. We now consider the case of two colleges
where the colleges differ in their evaluation of relative prestige and the demand and supply
parameters. As we found previously the best response functions for colleges is given by:
a1 = θ1 − γ1
2a2
a2 (A.24)
a2 = θ2 − γ2
2a2
a1 (A.25)
Summing equation (A.24) and (A.25) and dividing by:
(a1 + a2) = (θ1 + θ2)− 1
2a2
(γ1a2 + γ2a1) (A.26)
=⇒ a¯ = θm − 1
4a2
(γ1a2 + γ2a1) (A.27)
where θm =
1
2(θ1 + θ2) and a =
1
2(a1 + a2). We now use the best response functions (A.24)
and (A.25) to solve for 12(γ1a2+γ2a1) in terms of the parameters and the average admissions
rate. To do this we multiply equation (A.24) by γ2 and equation (A.25) by γ1 and take the
sum:
1
2
(γ1a2 + γ2a1) =
1
2
(γ2θ1 + γ1θ2)− γ1γ2
2a2
1
2
(a1 + a2) (A.28)
= ρm − γ1γ2
2a
(A.29)
(A.30)
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where ρm =
1
2(γ2θ1 +γ1θ2). Substitute equation (A.29) into equation (eqn0:het2) to express
the average admissions rate as a function of the parameters:
a = θm − 1
2a2
ï
ρm − γ1γ2
2a
ò
(A.31)
a = θm − 1
4a3
[2ρma− γ1γ2] (A.32)
This simplifies to:
4a4 − 4θma3 + 2ρma− γ1γ2 = 0 (A.33)
Generically, there are four possible equilibria in the case where there is heterogeneity and
two colleges. First, we will show that this quartic reduces to the expected results when the
two colleges are identical. Then we will show how to solve this quartic analytically for a
special type of heterogeneity both for N = 2 and then for general N .
Claim: In the limit as θ1 = θ2 = θ and γ1 = γ2 = γ, we recover the same solutions as we
would from the homogeneous case.
Proof. In this case equation (A.33) reduces to:
4a4 − 4θa3 + 2γθa− γ2 = 0 (A.34)
(4a4 − γ2)− 2θa(2a2 − γ) = 0 (A.35)
(2a2 − γ)(2a2 + γ)− 2θa(2a2 − γ) = 0 (A.36)
(2a2 − γ)(2a2 + γ − 2θa) = 0 (A.37)
(2a2 − λθ2)(2a2 + λθ2 − 2θa) = 0 (A.38)
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There are four solutions:
a1 =
θ
2
Ä
1 +
√
1− 2λ
ä
(A.39)
a2 =
θ
2
Ä
1−√1− 2λ
ä
(A.40)
a3 = θ
√
λ (A.41)
a4 = −θ
√
λ (A.42)
Notice that a1 and a2 are the conjugate pair that we would get from evaluating the the
homogeneous case of equation (??) at N = 2.
A.2.3. Special Case of Heterogeneous Colleges with N = 2
When θ1 6= θ2 but γ1 = γ2 = γ, there are tractable closed-formed solutions to the game of
N = 2 heterogeneous schools, which we will explore1. This case corresponds to a situation
in which the school with the least inelastic demand places a greater weight on prestige.
To understand better what this case tells us, recall the definition of γi and express it as a
function of the model primitives:
γi ≡ λiθ2i (A.43)
=
2biri
(P0 − ci)2
(P0 − ci)2
(2Qibi)2
=
ri
2
2biQ2i
(A.44)
=
ri
2
QiP0
(A.45)
=
ribi
2
P 20
(A.46)
1We can show that for N = 2, and more general heterogeneity, γ1 6= γ2 and θ1 6= θ2, one can use the
quartic formula to obtain closed-form solutions that are less tractable than this special case.
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This last step comes from the assumption that the marginal applicant got a fee waiver and
applied for free. Therefore, at the total number of applications Qi, the inverse demand
equals zero, i.e. P (Qi) = 0 = P0 − biQi =⇒ b1Q1 = P0. Therefore, gamma is the ratio
of the monetary equivalent of a school having an admissions rate that is 12 that of its peer
group, to the college’s total maximum total revenue, i.e. the revenue if all students who
applied were accepted and paid the same prices as the candidate with the highest willingness
to pay. Since we assumed that γ1 = γ2 = γ, it follows from equation (A.46) that:
1
2
r1b1 =
1
2
r2b2 ≡ R. (A.47)
=⇒ r1 = r2 b2
b1
. (A.48)
If |b2| > |b1|, then College 2 faces a more elastic demand curve and has a lower economic
value of relative prestige than College 2, which faces a more inelastic demand curve. In
other words, the case γ1 = γ2 = γ correspond to a setting in which the most desirable elite
school, i.e. the one that faces the most inelastic demand curve, values relative prestige the
most.
Solutions
In a Nash equilibrium, the average admissions rate between the two competing schools must
solve the following quartic equation:
a4 − 1
2
(θ1 + θ2)a
3 +
γ(θ1 + θ2)
4
a− 1
4
γ2 = 0 (A.49)Ç
a4 −
Å
γ
2
ã2å
−
Å
a2 − γ
2
ã
1
2
(θ1 + θ2)a = 0 (A.50)Å
a2 +
Å
γ
2
ããÅ
a2 −
Å
γ
2
ãã
−
Å
a2 − γ
2
ã
1
2
(θ1 + θ2)a = 0 (A.51)Å
a2 −
Å
γ
2
ããÅ
a2 +
Å
γ
2
ã
− 1
2
(θ1 + θ2)a
ã
= 0 (A.52)Å
a2 −
Å
γ
2
ããÅ
a2 +
Å
γ
2
ã
− θma
ã
= 0 (A.53)
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There are four solutions to equation (A.53) which characterize the average admissions rate:
a1,2 =
θm
2
Ç
1±
 
1− 2γ
θ2m
å
(A.54)
a3,4 = ±
…
γ
2
(A.55)
The solutions a3,4 only hold for the degenerate case where θ1 = θ2. For these cases, the
best response functions are a1 = θ1− a2 and a2 = θ2− a1 which =⇒ θ1 = θ2, violating the
maintained assumption of heterogeneity that θ1 6= θ2. Moreover, the average admissions
rate in a4 < 0, which is unphysical. This leaves us with two possible average admissions
rates in equilibrium a1,2. To solve for the action of an individual college, ai as a function
of the average admissions rate, a, we use the best response function in equation (A.24):
a1 = θ1 − γ
2a2
a2 (A.56)
a1 = θ1 − γ
2a2
(2a− a1) (A.57)
=⇒ a1
Å
1− γ
2a2
ã
= θ1 − γ
a
(A.58)
=⇒ a1 =
θ1 − γaÄ
1− γ
2a2
ä (A.59)
Similarly, we can show that:
a2 =
θ2 − γaÄ
1− γ
2a2
ä (A.60)
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A.3. Comparative Static for Heterogeneous Case
To compute the comparative statics of the actions of colleges 1 and 2, we take derivatives
of the FOCs:
da1
dP0
=
dθ1
dP0
− a2 d
dP0
Å
γ
2a2
ã
−
Å
γ
2a2
ã
da2
dP0
(A.61)
da2
dP0
=
dθ2
dP0
− a1 d
dP0
Å
γ
2a2
ã
−
Å
γ
2a2
ã
da1
dP0
(A.62)
(A.63)
Subtracting equation (A.62) from equation (A.61):Å
da1
dP0
− da2
dP0
ã
=
d
dP0
(θ1 − θ2) + (a1 − a2) d
dP0
Å
γ
2a2
ã
+
Å
γ
2a2
ãÅ
da1
dP0
− da2
dP0
ã
(A.64)
=⇒
Å
da1
dP0
− da2
dP0
ã
=
d
dP0
(θ1 − θ2) + (a1 − a2) ddP0
Ä
γ
2a2
äÄ
1− γ
2a2
ä (A.65)
To simplify the expression in equation (A.65), we need to find values for three quantities;
d
dP0
(θ1 − θ2), the comparative static on relative demand, ddP0
Ä
γ
2a2
ä
the comparative static
on the adjustment factor, and the sign of
Ä
1− γ
2a2
ä
, the denominator.
Comparative Static on Relative Demand
We assume that the intercept of the inverse demand curves, P0, is the same for both types
of schools, but that the schools differ in their marginal cost, c1 6= c2, and differ in the price
sensitivity of demand, b1 6= b2. The price sensitivity of demand and the total number of
applicants applying to the schools are related in the following way, we assume that the
marginal applicant received an application fee waiver. Since there a total Qi applications,
this implies P (Qi) = 0 = P0 − biQi =⇒ b1Q1 = P02. The comparative static on relative
2This expression also holds approximately if the marginal applicant paid an application fee of Papp, as
long s P0  Papp
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demand can be expressed as:
θi =
P0 − ci
2biQi
=
P0 − ci
2P0
=
1
2
− ci
2P0
(A.66)
=⇒ θ1 − θ2 = −(c1 − c2)
2P0
(A.67)
=⇒ dθ1 − θ2
dP0
=
(c1 − c2)
2P 20
(A.68)
Comparative Static on Adjustment Factor
First, let us recall the definition of γi and express it as a function of P0 and other parameters.
Then we will impose γ1 = γ2 = γ to solve for the comparative static of the adjustment factorÄ
1− γ
2a2
ä
.
γi ≡ λiθ2i (A.69)
=
2biri
(P0 − ci)2
(P0 − ci)2
(2Qibi)2
=
ri
2
2biQ2i
(A.70)
=
ri
2
QiP0
(A.71)
=
ribi
2
P 20
(A.72)
This last step comes from the assumption that the marginal applicant got a fee waiver and
applied for free. There for at the total number of applications Qi, the inverse demand equals
zero, i.e. P (Qi) = 0 = P0 − biQi =⇒ b1Q1 = P0. Therefore, gamma is the ratio of the
monetary equivalent of a school having an admissions rate that is 12 that of its peer group
to the total maximum total revenue if all students who applied were accepted and paid the
same prices as the candidate with the highest willingness to pay. Since we assumed that
γ1 = γ2 = γ, it follows from equation (A.72) that:
1
2
r1b1 =
1
2
r2b2 ≡ R. (A.73)
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and hence γ is inversely proportional to the square of P0, with R being the constant of
proportionality:
=⇒ γ = R
P 20
(A.74)
=⇒ dγ
dP0
= −2γ
P0
(A.75)
From this expression, we can compute the comparative static on the adjustment factor as
a function of the parameters and the the demand elasticity of the average admissions rate,
a,
d
dP0
Å
γ
2a2
ã
=
dγ
dP0
Å
1
2a2
ã
− γ
a3
da
dP0
(A.76)
= −2γ
P0
Å
1
2a2
ã
− γ
a3
da
dP0
(A.77)
= −
Å
γ
a2P0
ãÅ
1 +
P0
a
da
dP0
ã
(A.78)
d
dP0
Å
γ
2a2
ã
= −
Å
γ
a2P0
ã
(1 + a) (A.79)
The comparative static on the adjustment factor is smaller the larger P0 is and smaller the
larger the average admissions rate is. If the demand elasticity is positive, the magnitude of
the adjustment factor increases with the average admissions rate elasticity. If the demand
elasticity is negative, as is the case of the low equilibrium, then the adjustment factor
increases in magnitude only if the demand elasticity is smaller than -1.
Sign of Denominator
To sign the difference
Ä
da1
dP0
− da2dP0
ä
, we label the college with the larger monopoly admission
rate as College 1 and the college with the lower monopoly admissions rate as College 2, i.e.
θ1 > θ2.
Claim: For the low equilibrium, a, 0 > 2a2 − γ and hence the denominator
Ä
1− γ
2a2
ä
< 0.
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Proof. Proof by contradiction. The admissions rate in the low equilibrium is given by
a− = θm2
(
1−
√
1− 2γ
θ2m
)
. We will show that if we assume 0 < 2a2−γ, instead of 0 > 2a2−γ,
that this will violate the condition for multiple equilibria 1 − 2γ
θ2m
> 0, which we have also
assumed to hold in order for the low admissions rate equilibrium to exist.
0 < 2a.2 − γ (A.80)
=⇒ 0 < θ
2
m
2
Ç
1− 2
 
1− 2γ
θ2m
+ 1− 2γ
θ2m
å
− γ (A.81)
=⇒ 0 < θ2m − 2γ − θ2m
 
1− 2γ
θ2m
(A.82)
=⇒ θ4m
Ç
1− 2γ
θ2m
å
< (θ2m − 2γ)2 (A.83)
=⇒ θ4m − 2γθ2m < θ4m − 4γθ2m + 4γ2 (A.84)
=⇒ 2γθ2m
Ç
1− 2γ
θ2m
å
< 0 (A.85)
=⇒
Ç
1− 2γ
θ2m
å
< 0 (A.86)
Claim: If in low equilibrium and θ1 > θ2, then a1 − a2 < 0 and the school with the higher
monopoly admissions rate has the lower competitive admissions rate.
Proof. Solving the best response function we know:
ai =
θi − γa
1− γ
2a2
(A.87)
=⇒ a1 − a2 = θ1 − θ2
1− γ
2a2
(A.88)
=⇒ a1 − a2 = −(θ1 − θ2)|1− γ
2a2
| (A.89)
=⇒ a1 − a2 < 0 (A.90)
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A.3.1. Heterogeneous Responses to Demand Shocks
Claim: Given two colleges, 1 & 2, where College 2 has a lower monopoly admissions rate
than College 1, i.e. θ1 > θ2, if the colleges coordinate on the low average admissions
rate, a¯L, and if the elasticity of the average admissions rate is sufficiently negative, i.e.
d < −1 + a¯
2
L
γ
∣∣∣ θ1−θ2a1−a2 ∣∣∣, then College 2 decreases its admissions, a2 rate by more than College
1, a1 when faced with a common demand shock.
Proof. In the low admissions equilibrium, 2a¯2L−γ < 0, and θ1−θ2 > 0, which together =⇒
a1 − a2 < 0. Going back to equation (??) we can simplify the expression for da1dP0 − da2dP0 > 0
using the results of equation (A.68) and (A.79):Å
da1
dP0
− da2
dP0
ã
=
(c1−c2)
2P 20
− (a1 − a2)
Å
γ
a¯2LP0
ã
(1 + a)Å
1− γ
2a¯2L
ã (A.91)
= −
Å
θ1 − θ2
P0
ã ï1 + Äa1−a2θ1−θ2 ä Å γa¯2Lã (1 + a)òÅ
1− γ
2a¯2L
ã (A.92)
= −
Å
θ1 − θ2
P0
ã ï1− ∣∣∣a1−a2θ1−θ2 ∣∣∣Å γa¯2Lã (1 + a)òÅ
1− γ
2a¯2L
ã (A.93)
= −
Å
θ1 − θ2
P0
ã [2a¯2L − γ (2 ∣∣∣a1−a2θ1−θ2 ∣∣∣ (1 + a))](
2a¯2L − γ
) (A.94)Å
da1
dP0
− da2
dP0
ã
= − 1
2a¯2L − γ
Å
θ1 − θ2
P0
ã
︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
Å
2a¯2L − γ
ï
2
∣∣∣∣a1 − a2θ1 − θ2
∣∣∣∣ (1 + a)òã (A.95)
=⇒ da1
dP0
− da2
dP0
> 0 (A.96)
=⇒ 0 < 2a¯2L − γ
ï
2
∣∣∣∣a1 − a2θ1 − θ2
∣∣∣∣ (1 + a)ò (A.97)
=⇒ a < −1 + a¯
2
L
γ
∣∣∣∣ θ1 − θ2a1 − a2
∣∣∣∣ (A.98)
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A.4. General N Heterogeneous Case
We also have analytically tractable results for the case of N colleges, where there are N2 type
1 colleges (θ1) and
N
2 low type 2 colleges (θ2). While θ1 > θ2, we still maintain γ1 = γ2 = γ,
to preserve analytic tractability while allowing for heterogeneity.
Claim: For this case of N colleges of two types, there exist multiple equilibria if 4γ
θ2m
Ä
N−1
N
ä
<
1, where θm =
1
2(θ1 + θ2).
Proof. By symmetry, the type 1 colleges will follow an identical action a1 and the type
2 colleges will follow an identical a2 action. The best response functions evaluated at a1
and a1 give a relationship between these optimal actions and the average admissions rate
a¯ = 12(a1 + a2):
a2 = θ2 − γ
a¯2
1
N
ïÅ
N
2
− 1
ã
a2 +
Å
N
2
ã
a1
ò
(A.99)
=⇒ a2 = θ2 − γ
a¯
+
1
N
γ
a¯2
a2 (A.100)
a1 = θ1 − γ
a¯2
1
N
ïÅ
N
2
− 1
ã
a1 +
Å
N
2
ã
a2
ò
(A.101)
=⇒ a1 = θ1 − γ
a¯
+
1
N
γ
a¯2
a1 (A.102)
Summing the two best response functions in equation (A.100) and (A.102):
(a1 + a2) = (θ1 + θ2)− 2γ
a¯
+
1
N
γ
a¯2
(a1 + a2) (A.103)
=⇒ a¯ = θm − γ
a¯
+
γ
Na¯
(A.104)
=⇒ a¯2 − θma¯+ γ
Å
N − 1
N
ã
(A.105)
In equilibrium, the average admissions, a¯, rate takes on one of two values; a high value a¯H
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and a lower value a¯L:
a¯H =
θm
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4γ
θ2m
Å
N − 1
N
ã)
(A.106)
a¯L =
θm
2
(
1−
√
1− 4γ
θ2m
Å
N − 1
N
ã)
(A.107)
In the high average admissions rate equilibrium, a¯H , the two colleges have equilibrium
actions (a1H , a2H) given by:
(a1H , a2H) =
Ñ
θ1 − γa¯H
1− γ
Na¯2H
,
θ2 − γa¯H
1− γ
Na¯2H
é
(A.108)
In the low average admissions rate equilibrium, a¯L, the two colleges have equilibrium actions
(a1L, a2L) given by:
(a1L, a2L) =
Ñ
θ1 − γa¯L
1− γ
Na¯2L
,
θ2 − γa¯L
1− γ
Na¯2L
é
(A.109)
107
A.5. Chapter 3: Appendix
Country Comparison 
BAHAMAS: 
 
 Colonial Origin: British 
 Legal  System: British Common Law 
 Population: 309,156   
 Area (Main Island): 207 km2 
 Per capita GDP 
 $3,330.79 (1976) 
 GDP composition by sector: 
 agriculture: 3%  
 industry: 7%  
 services: 90% 
 Property Rights 
Natives: protected 
 Foreigners: protected, except 
during 1981-1993: 
“Immovable Property Act” 
(IPA) 
BARBADOS: 
 
 Colonial Origin: British 
 Legal System: British Common Law 
 Population: 284,589 
 Area : 433 km2 
 Per capita GDP 
 $1,767.94 (1976) 
 GDP composition by sector: 
 agriculture: 6%  
 industry: 16%  
 services: 78% 
 Property Rights 
 Natives: protected 
 Foreigners: protected 
 
Figure 11: Country Comparison.
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Table 16: Effect of Law Change on GDP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IPA81 0.2790 0.1528 0.1499 0.1531
(0.0502) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0429)
BAH 0.4889 0.5270 0.5121 0.5284
(0.0395) (0.0464) (0.0472) (0.0481)
BAH x TIME -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0015
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0035)
NFDI 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
IPA81 x NFDI -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
NFDI LAG
log(CPI) 1.0360 1.0460 1.0380
(0.1118) (0.1115) (0.1142)
GOV -0.0392
(0.0440)
GOV LAG -0.0620
(0.0441)
HURR 0.0044
(0.0360)
TIME 0.0547 0.0111 0.0105 0.0110
(0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Const. 7.8557 4.0840 4.0570 4.0750
(0.0378) (0.4082) (0.4067) (0.4184)
Adjusted R 0.9468 0.9794 0.9796 0.9790
F-stat 350.80 402.60 316.20 345.60
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Table 17: Using Legal Reform as Instrument for Net FDI
Excl. Restriction First Stage Second Stage
IPA81 -145.82 0.143 0.223
(89.92) (0.076) (0.058)
BAH 41.27 0.554 0.526
(60.64) (0.049) (0.046)
TIME 7.07 0.008 0.006
(6.61) (0.005) (0.006)
IPLHA93 -38.42 -0.047
(140.17) (0.123)
TIMExIPLHA93 42.64 0.019
(13.02) (0.013)
log(CPI) -99.02 1.109 1.135
(148.57) (0.118) (0.127)
BAHxTIME 9.02 -0.004 -0.007
(8.56) (0.008) (0.006)
NFDI 0.000
(0.000)
IPA81xNFDI 0.000
(0.000)
NFDI2SLS 0.000
(0.000)
IPA81xNFDI2SLS -0.001
(0.001)
intercept 3.82 3.72
(0.43) (0.46)
Adjusted R 0.8306 0.98 0.9809
F-stat 42.32 321.4 432.8
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Table 18: Robustness Checks, Counter-factuals, and Placebo Tests
Bahamas Only Bahamas No IPA Barbados IPA
IPA81 0.1650 0.0097
(0.0534) (0.0460)
NFDI 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
TIME 0.0172 0.0061 0.0107
(0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0084)
log(CPI) 0.8807 1.1835 1.0440
(0.2929) (0.2851) (0.1784)
IPA81xNFDI -0.0005
(0.0004)
Intercept 5.1680 4.1303 4.0460
(1.0560) (1.0365) (0.6284)
Adjusted R 0.9617 0.9488 0.9780
F-stat 146.7000 180.3000 322.6000
Table 19: Robustness Checks: Auto-correlation
1 2 3
Residual (t-1) 0.43 0.15 -0.17
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Residual (t-2) 0.03 0.15
(0.15) (0.16)
Residual (t-3) -0.42 -0.42
(0.15) (0.13)
Residual (t-4) -0.35 -0.52
(0.17) (0.16)
Residual (t-5) -0.25
(0.16)
Adjusted R 0.15 0.37 0.51
F-stat 6.07 4.68 6.05
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